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The transition of the United States from a country of second
asylum to first asylum has stimulated renewed debate about asylum in this country and fostered animated discussion about the
need for legislative reform to address the problems associated
with this country's new status. The current statutory scheme, enacted as part of the Refugee Act of 1980, is not designed to handle the many thousands of asylum applications filed by foreign
nationals who are physically present in the United States without
the benefit of lawful immigration status. Essentially, the discussion is about which of the many asylum seekers who manage to
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reach this country will be allowed to remain here, perhaps,permanently. Although a discretionaryform of relief,asylum potentially
operates as a "backdoor" to regularpermanent immigration sta-

tus in this country. In this article, Professor Vaughns argues that
the judicialprocess is not well-suited to resolve the remaining issues that fuel the current asylum debate and thus there is a need
for a legislative resolution.Professor Vaughns offers a reform proposal designed to provide more definitive guidelines about the substantive qualifying criteria for asylum relief which were not
defined specifically in the 1980 congressional enactment. Because

asylum is, after all, a matter of public policy, Professor Vaughns
believes that the politicalforum is better suited than the judiciary
to make these choices.
The judicial process is quite unsuited to deal dispositively with
the many issues arising from our immigration statutes and policies.
Its nature limits our vision to the alien before us and conceals from
us the problems of the multitudes of aliens, both within and without the Nation, who wish to reside legally within the United States.

-Judge

Sneed, dissenting in Wang v. INS'

INTRODUCTION

The question of asylum and refugee protection-"this most sensitive of human claims in the international community" 2-- is not a
subject of discourse unique to the twentieth century. 3 The vastly increased speed of communication and the availability of global transportation, however, have dramatically altered the magnitude of the
1. 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980) (Sneed, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. INS v.
Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981). In a separate opinion in a case criticizing the
Ninth Circuit's approach to political asylum cases, Judge Sneed wrote:
The Ninth Circuit has held that political neutrality is a political opinion for
purposes of [U.S.C. § 1153(h)]. This holding eviscerates the political opinion
requirement of the statute. It means that a politically inactive alien, and perhaps most illegal aliens are, may now gain the protection of asylum.
The core idea of political activism underlies the concept of "refugee" status
....
We distort the meaning of an important requirement for refugee status
when we permit political aloofness to serve as an active "political opinion," that
endangers its holder. It also demeans the true martyr for whom asylum was
intended.
It is not likely this concurring opinion will alter either the statutory or case
law with which it is concerned. Nonetheless, from time to time sightings should
be taken to establish one's position. Our ship appears to be at some distance
from the main fleet but no reefs or shoals appear dead ahead. As a passenger, I
shall go below and hope for the best.
Mendoza-Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 767-68 (9th Cir. 1990) (Sneed, J., concurring).
2. Reyes-Arias v. INS, 866 F.2d 500, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Starr, J.).
3. "The problem of refugees and how to deal with them is as old as man's presence
on Earth." John P. Humphrey, Rapporteur'sIntroduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Alan E. Nash ed., 1988). See

also John A. Scanlan & O.T. Kent, The Force of Moral Arguments for a Just Immigration Policy in a Hobbesian Universe: The Contemporary American Example, in OPEN
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problem, if not its moral dimension. 4 No national right is more zealously guarded than the sovereign's right to control its borders; nor is
any moral principle more vehemently advocated than the humanrights-based insistence that foreign nationals fleeing life-threatening
conditions in their homelands be provided refuge in neighboring
countries. The challenge for nation-states in the twenty-first century
will be to respond appropriately to future refugee flows of increasingly large numbers consistent with responsibilities owed members of
their political communities and with international obligations.
Underlying the philosophical conflict is a more basic political and
economic one. Nations close their borders to regular immigration to
preserve the living standards, social contracts, and political cohesion
of current citizens against the massive potential impact of unregulated arrivals. Nations with a moral commitment to allowing "refugees" to immigrate free of the normal constraints draw an
increasingly fine line between those who immigrate "voluntarily" to
improve their lot in life, "pulled" in by the magnet of better economic, political, and social conditions, and those who flee persecution, that is, who are "pushed" out of their country of origin. The
false dichotomy between those pushed and those pulled, between
"refugees" and economic migrants, underlies much of the confusion
in this field. Persons whose homeland is laid waste, be it by protracted civil war, by severe climatic conditions naturally causing
famine, or by severe economic deprivation, are "pushed" from their
countries of origin rather than suffer the loss of their lives through

IssuEs 61, 65 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988) ("Human migration is a phenomenon probably as old as humankind.").
4. See, e.g., Tina M. Campbell, Note, Immigration Law: The Role of the Supreme
Court in Policy Development, 22 NEW ENG. L. REv. 131, 161 (1987) ("We are a people
torn between the sovereign need to protect our society and our awareness of humanitarian duty to provide safe refuge to those who have a valid claim for flight from tyranny
and persecution."). See also Kenneth D. Brill, Note, The Endless Debate: Refugee Law
and Policy and the 1980 Refugee Act, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 117, 118 (1983-1984)
("Refugee policy has been one of the contradictory strains running through American
foreign policy since World War II.").
The controversy arises, of course, when large influxes of asylum-seekers stream across
international borders or arrive "unbidden" on sovereign shores. Moreover, these individuals are more likely to be fleeing from violence and political upheaval resulting from internal strife in their homelands than from external forces of aggression. Further
complicating factors are the current worldwide recession and the ever-increasing gap in
wealth between the industrialized nations in which refugees seek refuge and the developing countries that produce them. Thus, even when the grant of-safe haven is temporary,
the likelihood of voluntary repatriation is not a real possibility once the dangerous conditions in the homeland subside.
BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES? THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL

starvation or the violence of war. It is difficult to differentiate mor-

ally between people fleeing death by the random gunfire of a civil
war and those fleeing death by firing squad because they took up
arms or publicly advocated political support for the wrong side. Once
the policy decision to limit economic immigration has been made,
however, some line must be drawn among these "emergency" immigrants, 5 despite their equally strong claims to humanitarian succor.

This compelling human drama poses a profound dilemma, and international efforts to resolve these competing moral claims consumed
the better part of the 1980s-often called "the decade of refugees." 6
In the United States, after years of haphazard treatment of refugee
issues and piecemeal legislation,7 Congress was driven by the country's immigrant tradition and historic policy of "welcoming homeless
refugees to our shores"' to enact the Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee
Act). 9 As the centerpiece of this new law, Congress adopted a neutral standard of eligibility for establishing refugee status, eradicating
years of ideological and geographical discrimination in according
protection to refugees seeking asylum in the United States. 10
5. All foreign nationals who enter, lawfully or otherwise, or who seek to enter the
United States are presumed to be intending immigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA). See INA §§ 101(a)(15), 214(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15),
1184(b).
6. Maryellen Fullerton, Restricting the Flow of Asylum-Seekers in Belgium,
Denmark, the FederalRepublic of Germany, and the Netherlands: New Challenges to
the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention
on Human Rights, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 35, 35 (1988).
7. See generally Doris Meissner, Reflections on the Refugee Act of 1980, in THE
NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980s, 57-66 (David A. Martin ed.,
1986).
8. A major purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 is the establishment of a comprehensive refugee resettlement and assistance policy. Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act),
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (1988)). Another
goal is to "insure a fair and workable asylum policy which is consistent with this country's tradition of welcoming the oppressed of other nations." H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1979). Indeed, § 101(a) of the Refugee Act explicitly states:
[I]t is the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of
persons subject to persecution in their homelands, including, where appropriate, humanitarian assistance for their care and maintenance in asylum areas,
efforts to promote opportunities for resettlement or voluntary repatriation, aid
for necessary transportation and processing, admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and transitional assistance to refugees in the United States.
Moreover, "special access" to refugee protection has been an imperative ever
since the failure of nation-states to respond to the plight of Jews fleeing Nazi
Germany.
DENNIS GALLAGHER ET AL., SAFE HAVEN: POLICY RESPONSES TO REFUGEE-LIKE SITUATIONS 3 (Refugee Policy Group 1987).

9. Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-59, 1253(h), 1521-24 (1988)).
10. Congress adopted the refugee definition that appears in the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (U.N. Convention). Although not a U.N.
Convention signatory, the United States is a party to the Protocol Relating to the Status
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With the passage of the Refugee Act, Congress created two separate programs for refugee protection. The programs are commonly
called "political asylum" (the in-state processing of asylum claims
based on refugee status)" and "overseas refugees" (the processing of
refugee resettlement claims for entry into the United States, usually
from refugee encampments abroad). These programs are not a part
of the regulated flow of lawful immigration to the United States,
which is fundamentally premised on the control of numbers.12 Moreover, the Refugee Act was "[d]rafted from the perspective of the
United States as a country of "second asylum."' 3 Because political
asylum is available to those already physically present inside the
United States, notwithstanding their unlawful immigration status,
the potential "loophole" that asylum relief poses is all too apparent.' 4 Therefore, this Article will focus specifically on the need to
of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, and
thus is derivatively bound by all the important operative provisions of the U.N.
Convention.
11. "Political asylum" includes an affirmative grant of immigration status based on
asylum relief under § 208 of the INA. An asylum-seeker may file an application with
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), unless the INS has commenced deportation proceedings, in which event the application may be filed in the immigration
court, 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (1991), as a form of relief from deportation.
A corollary form of asylum-like relief, which statutorily preceded § 208 governing
asylum relief, is also available under § 243(h) of the INA, as amended, Pub. L. No. 82414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in various sections of 8 U.S.C. (1988)), to
foreign nationals who apply in-state. This form of relief is called "withholding of deportation." It is also referred to as "non-refoulement," which codifies the United States
obligation under United Nations Protocol. It is usually available in deportation or exclusion proceedings but now, under the new asylum regulations, is combined with an affirmative asylum application. See 28 C.F.R. § 208.3 (1991). The § 208 form of asylum
relief is available whether or not the alien is in deportation proceedings. However, unlike
§ 208 asylum, which accords an affirmative immigration status if relief is granted,
§ 243(h) relief merely prohibits the foreign national's return to the country of persecution. In other words, the "withholding" form of relief does not prevent removal to a third
country, although such an event is rare. However, in light of recent case law development, the necessity of seeking "withholding" has virtually become a nullity. Both forms
of relief will be discussed more fully infra.
12. But see John A. Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical
Control, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 820 (1982) (observing that the fundamental premise
of United States immigration law based on numerical control is more an "illusion" than
a "reality"). Professor Scanlan is chiefly concerned that bona fide refugees are most
likely to be adversely affected by "this strong interest in controlling [the numbers of
immigrants allowed to enter this country]." Id.
13. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France: Lessons for the United States, 17 MICH. J.L. REF.
183, 183-84 (1984).
14. As Professor Martin observed in an earlier article:
Asylum constitutes a wild card in the immigration deck. No other provision
of the INA opens such a broad potential prospect of U.S. residency to aliens

reform the statutory scheme in light of the potential that asylum
relief poses an alternative route to regular immigration.
In enacting the asylum provisions of the Refugee Act, Congress
delegated responsibility for establishing an in-state procedure for adjudicating asylum claims to the Attorney General. The Attorney
General has in turn delegated this matter to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). Congress no doubt contemplated that
the delegated agency, in implementing the statutory provisions,
would provide content to the Refugee Act's substantive standards in
the course of a case-by-case agency adjudication. Agency determinations in this particular area of the law, however, have not been met
with acceptance but rather with much skepticism. In fact, critics of
the Reagan and Bush administrations believe quite strongly that prohibited racial and foreign policies drove the administration of asylum
adjudications and refugee policy initiatives.1" Perhaps for this reason, agency decisions in this area have spawned considerable court
litigation. Not surprisingly, the current case-by-case approach to
asylum adjudication has left the substantive aspects of qualifying for
refugee status quite unsettled, and thus far a judicial resolution has
remained elusive. Unless some kind of resolution is achieved soon,
however, the chaos created by varying interpretations of the threshold criteria will dominate the adjudication process well into the next
century. 16
This Article offers a modest legislative proposal to revise the substantive standards governing asylum grants. 17 The thrust of the proposal is intended to bring some modicum of order and stability to the
without the inconvenience of prescreening or selection. An alien may enter in
flagrant disregard of U.S. immigration laws, but if he meets the asylum test, he
is entitled to stay in the United States indefinitely and to advance toward permanent residence here. By the very .nature of the UN Protocol commitment,
the United States is not entitled to apply other criteria in deciding whether to
extend this protection--criteria such as family ties, other U.S. connections, or
employment skills, routinely applied to other intending immigrants.
David A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES, 1982 MIcH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91, 112 [hereinafter Martin, The Refugee Act]. See generally David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. Rav. 1247, 1267-70
(1990) [hereinafter Martin, Reforming Asylum] (discussing asylum as a loophole in the
regular immigration selection system and the need for control).
15. See, e.g., Malissa Lennox, Refugees, Racism, and Repatriations:A Critique of
the United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 687 (1993); see also
Helton, infra note 122 (discussing foreign policy bias in refugee policy).
16. In noting that the reaction of the federal courts to the Board of Immigration
Appeals' jurisprudence in asylum decision-making "has been mixed," Professor
Aleinikoff concluded that, taken together, "the Board and the court decisions have created neither a coherent set of principles, nor a convincing theoretical approach to the
issues." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of "Persecution" in United States Asylum Law, 3 INT'L J. REF. L. 5, 10 (1991).
17. INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. 11 1990). "Asylum" is the protection accorded by a state to individuals seeking such protection. ATLE GPAHL-MADSEN,
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administrative decision-making process. In view of the orderly mechanism Congress created for the overseas refugee program, it seems
unlikely that the legislators intended the in-state asylum program to
become a vehicle for creating a whole new emergency immigrant
class outside the regular system of immigration; yet that has been
the practical effect. Thus, the inability to control the ever-increasing
numbers of asylum-seekers, together with the burdens they impose
on the receiving country, makes greater scrutiny of their applications
imperative.18 However, this proposal is not intended to shore up the
INS's seemingly harsh policies in implementing the asylum provisions. Rather, it is intended to benefit the agency and courts alike by
showing more clearly congressional intent concerning who qualifies
for asylum relief sought inside the United States.
Part I of the Article provides a historical backdrop by examining
the classical definition of "refugee," which set the stage for the
problems experienced today. To put the pertinent issues in context,
Part II of the Article discusses the statutory framework and regulatory scheme established in the 1980s for the in-state treatment of
asylum relief. Part II also charts the subsequent case law and regulatory policy developments that have played a critical role in focusing the asylum debate over the past decade. Part II then discusses
the new issues that animate the debate in the 1990s. This exploration examines the reasons why the eighties became the decade of the
refugee and why the problems of asylum relief are likely to persist
throughout the nineties and on into the twenty-first century. Part II
also suggests that the recent Supreme Court decision in INS v.
Elias-Zacariasl9 is unlikely materially to resolve the current refugee
controversy. Supreme Court cases in the past, while instructive, have
tended to open up further areas of debate, contributing to further
confusion in the law. This new Supreme Court decision is likely to
do so as well.20
TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 1 (1980)
GENERAL DES RESOLUTIONS 58

(citing INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, TABLEAU
(1957)).
18. Martin, Reforming Asylum, supra note 14.
19. 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), digested in 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 166 (1992).
20. As noted in a recent commentary on the Elias-Zacariascase:
The bottom line, however, is that we know little more than before EliasZacariaswas decided about the meaning of "persecution on account of political opinion" and its application to concrete cases, except that Elias-Zacarias
failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his claim. The administrative
agencies and the courts of appeal thus will continue in a process that already
has consumed the past 10 years, with little meaningful guidance provided by
the Supreme Court.

Part III of the Article provides an overview of the problem and
the factors that fuel the debate. It analyzes the current situation and
puts forward reasons why Congress should seize the moment to take
legislative action. Part III concludes that a definitive resolution is
unlikely unless clearer guidelines are provided by Congress to guide
agency decision-making and to signal congressional intent to the
courts with greater specificity.
Part IV of the Article discusses the shortcomings of a judicial approach to resolving asylum and refugee issues and suggests, instead,
substantive legislative changes. Underlying this proposal is the recognition that the scheme enacted by the Refugee Act of 1980 was
designed to adjudicate asylum claims on an individualized, case-bycase basis, but provided few guidelines for decision-making. Consequently, to the extent that large-scale refugee flows are likely to increase, we shall need either more generalized forms of refugee-like
relief that are broader in scope, such as the recently enacted temporary "safe haven" legislation, 21 or amendments of the current definitional terms to describe more precisely the governing statutory
provisions for permanent asylum relief. Either way, it behooves Congress to act, lest a vast influx of emergency immigrants, or "refugees," who do not fit so neatly into the current statutory definition,
swamp the broader and more orderly immigration policies that Congress enacted for the regular flow of lawful immigration into this
country.
As the twenty-first century draws near, Congress could act swiftly
and bring closure to those key issues that remain. Indeed, a number
of pertinent events over the past few years have made the time opportune to revisit the statutory scheme. But first, a look to the past
may be instructive in setting the agenda for action.
I.

A.

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Classic Definition of Refugee
1. In General

The issues concerning refugees and political asylum are among the
most controversial in immigration law today.22 However, the issue
Deborah E. Anker et al., The Supreme Court's Decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias: Is
There Any "There" There?, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 285 (1992).
21. INA § 244A, as added and amended Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, Tit. III,
§ 302(a), of the Immigration Act of 1990, created a new program to grant "temporary
protected status" (TPS) to certain aliens for whom returning to their homelands would
be unsafe.
22. Stephen H. Legomsky, Political Asylum and the Theory of Judicial Review,
73 MINN. L. REV. 1205, 1205 (1989) ("Few problems challenge the national conscience
in quite the same way as asylum.").
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that has stirred the most controversy2 is the meaning of the term
"refugee" as applied in the context of the stateside political asylum
program. 24 Congress adopted the statutory definition of "refugee" almost verbatim from the classic definition contained in the International Convention on Refugee Protection drafted in 1951. That
definition 25 governs eligibility for the statutorily created programs 26
of overseas refugee resettlement 27 and in-state political asylum.2" To
meet this definition under either program, an applicant must demonstrate "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

23.

Thus far, four cases dealing with asylum issues have been argued in the United

States Supreme Court over the past few years. See, e.g., 68

INTERPRETER RELEASES

1429, 1483, 1605 (1991). Of particular note, the Supreme Court heard two asylum cases
(INS v. Doherty, No. 90-925, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 376 (1992) and INS v. Elias-Zacarias)
in the first two months of the 1991-1992 term. In another asylum case, INS v. CanasSegovia (No. 90-1246, filed February 6, 1991), carried over from the previous term, the
government's certiorari petition was granted. On reconsideration after remand, the Ninth
Circuit, in finding for the asylum applicant on the basis of the imputed political opinion
theory, held that "[n]othing in Elias-Zacariaschanges [the court's] analysis." CanasSegovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992).
See also McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., No. 92-344 (involving the controversial Haitian refugee case challenging the federal government's forced return policy of

Haitians interdicted on the high seas), in 70

INTERPRETER RELEASES

123 (1993). This

case was argued in the Supreme Court on March 2, 1993 (decision now pending at this
writing). Id. at 277-81. One of the issues to be decided in this case is whether United
States refugee law applies to persons outside the United States territory. Id. at 277.
24. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Emerging Political Consensus on Immigration
Law, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 7 (1991) ("What has generated the most controversy, however, is the law's brief provision relating to asylum, designed for refugees who reach U.S.
territory rather than seeking resettlement from overseas."). On the other hand, little debate or controversy has arisen over the administration of the overseas refugee program.
But see T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND
POLICY 722-31 (2d ed. 1991) (regarding the considerable public controversy caused by
the more rigorous application of the refugee definition in the overseas refugee programs).
25. See Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212 § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1988)), which lists race, religion, national origin,
membership in a particular social group, and political opinion as the designated categories qualifying the well-founded fear of persecution required to establish refugee status
under the Act.
26. In 1980 Congress established two distinct programs (i.e., the overseas refugee
program and the in-state asylum program) under the Refugee Act that can lead to the
granting of' permanent resident status to those foreign nationals who qualify as
"refugees."
27. Commonly called the "overseas refugee program," this particular program provides for the admission of refugees from abroad, including financial assistance and permanent resettlement in the United States automatically after one year. INA § 207, 8
U.S.C. § 1157 (Supp. 11 1990).
28. See INA § 208.

political opinion."29 As a practical matter, however, the classic definition is ill-suited for present-day application.30
2.

The Origins of the Definition

The refugee definition is a product of a bygone era.31 In 1951 the
International Convention drafters were dealing with a known population of displaced persons generated by the prevailing political climate.3 2 As one international commentator noted, "[T]he Convention
was tailored by the Western Bloc for its own purposes in dealing
mainly with the Eastern European refugee situation, favouring a
particular characterization of the cause of the refugee problem and a
particular [political] solution. 33 The classic definition was thus conceived at a time when the ideological alignments between politically
antagonistic countries in the East and West were more clearly
defined.

4

Today, the 1951 United Nations Convention and its update, the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 35 remain the prin29. INA § 101(a)(42).
30. Also, the universal definition of "refugee" may be unduly restrictive in the
context of the overseas program. See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 717
(asking whether it is sound policy to continue using the same definition for the overseas
program given that the Convention and Protocol do not require that their signatory states
admit anyone.)
31. The United Nations sponsored a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 1951 to
address the need for legal protection of refugees. U.N. Convention, opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. See supra note 10. Article I of the U.N. Convention
expressly confers protection only on refugees from events that occurred prior to January
1,1951. Id. at 152. As stated by Professor Martin, "This framework shamed itself in the
world's woefully inadequate response in the 1930s and 1940s to those who were fleeing
Nazi persecution. From the ashes of World War II arose an international structure that
signalled a determination, measured but genuine, to do more for refugees." Martin, Reforming Asylum, supra note 14, at 1253-55.

32. Martin, Reforming Asylum, supra note 14, at 1255 n.15 (citing Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill, The Future of InternationalRefugee Law, REFUGEES, Oct. 1988, at 27,
28).
33.

G.J.L. Coles, The Human Rights Approach to the Solution of the Refugee

Problem: A Theoretical and PracticalEnquiry, in HUMAN RIGHTS

AND THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 211-12 (Alan E. Nash ed., 1987).

34. A Convention participant has written:
As one who has participated in the drafting of the Convention, I can say that
the drafters did not have specific restrictions in mind when they used this terminology. Theirs was an effort to express in legal terms what is generally considered as a political refugee. The Convention was drafted at a time when the
cold war was at its height. The drafters thought mainly of the refugees from
Eastern Europe and they had no doubt that these refugees fulfilled the definition they had drafted.

Paul Weis, Convention Refugees and De Facto Refugees, in

AFRICAN REFUGEES AND

15, 15 (Ghoran Melander & Peter Nobel eds., 1978). Moreover, the drafters
feared that a majority of the nation-states would not become signatories to the Convention unless its definition was circumscribed. Thus, it would seem that the main concern at
the Convention was adopting a definition that would be universally accepted.
35. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), 606 U.N.T.S. 267. The
THE LAW
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cipal international instruments benefiting refugees. The nonrefoulement36 (i.e., nonreturn) provisions of these international agreements
mandate that no alien who is likely to be persecuted shall be returned to his or her homeland. 37 Although nation-states are bound
by the principle of nonrefoulement (which does not require a permanent right of resettlement), they retain discretion regarding both the
grant of asylum (i.e., permanent resettlement) and the conditions
under which asylum may be obtained or terminated.38 Nonetheless,
most countries have incorporated, with slight modifications, the
United Nations Convention definition into their domestic laws and
policies, usually providing for permanent refugee resettlement
through the grant of asylum.
However, as noted above, this definition is limited to a demonstration of persecution based on the five enumerated categories. While
the United States may be bound by international treaty to give certain protection rights to refugees, this treaty does not require the
granting of asylum, whether as temporary refuge or permanent resi-

dence in this country, contrary to established domestic laws reflecting immigration policies. Therefore, the nonrefoulement obligation
(i.e., no return to a country where the refugee is likely to be perse-

cuted) is the most that international agreements guarantee.3 9 This

obligation does not require the permanent resettlement of refugees
(or the granting of asylum to those seeking it)40

Protocol updates the protection accorded under the U.N. Convention to persons who became refugees as a result of events occurring after January 1, 1951. The Protocol
changes the 1951 time line in Article 1 and incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the
Convention.
36. The word refoulement is the French term for "return," commonly used to refer
to the return of refugees in circumstances involving persecution. See Douglas Gross,
Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1125 (1980).
37. INA § 234(h). In 1968 the United States became a party to the Protocol
thereby obligating itself-like the other signatories--to apply the Protocol's non-refoulement requirement. This obligation is, however, country specific. Although in 1968 the
statutory codification of that obligation was expressed in discretionary terms (a carryover from the 1952 enactment of the INA), today this obligation is set forth in § 243(h)
of the INA. This section thus mandates the withholding of any alien's deportation if the
alien demonstrates by a "clear probability" that his or her life or freedom would be
threatened if returned to his or her homeland.
38. Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-84 (1983).
39. See Martin, Reforming Asylum, supra note 14, at 1253, 1255-56 n.16 (calling
U.N. Convention guarantees minimal, citing to Paul Weis, The Draft United Nations
Convention on TerritorialAsylum, 50 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 151-71 (1971)).
40. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 38, at 104-05.

3.

The Concept of "Refugee" in InternationalLaw

At the international level,4 1 refugee law is considered "a means of
institutionalizing societal concern for the well-being of those forced
to flee their countries, grounded in the concept of humanitarianism
and in basic principles of human rights. ' 42 It is a well-settled maxim
of international law, however, that separate "sovereign" states have
the right to refuse to grant asylum. 3 In other words,
"[i]nternational law cannot compel protection decisions inconsistent
with national interests. 44 So, at the domestic level, refugee law does
not fully embody either humanitarian or human rights principles.4 r
In fact, "[r]efugee law .. .reaches a dead-end as human rights
law because it collides with the principle of national sovereignty."4 6
Moreover, given that the forces that create "refugees"-whether political or economic-make voluntary repatriation unlikely, the most
frequently advocated "durable" solution in today's climate is perma-

nent resettlement.4 7 However, permanent resettlement is unlikely to
be a satisfactory solution. In the United States, as in most other
countries, permanent resettlement is available only to those foreign
nationals who establish refugee status under the statutory or classic
definition. Individuals fleeing the general upheaval, turmoil, and
strife caused by war, violence, economic deprivation, or natural disaster in their homelands 48 do not ordinarily qualify for protection
41.

For general treatments of the international law relating to refugees, see

GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 38; ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN

(1966).
42. James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the UnderlyingPremise of Refugee
Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 129 (1990).
43. See supra discussion accompanying notes 38-40.
The twentieth century introduced new social forces that critically narrowed ...
historical avenues of escape in the course of a single generation: a new racism
made conversion impossible and a universal network of immigration restrictions
rendered physical flight extremely difficult. Hence, complete control of the
globe by sovereign nation states has made possible the expulsion of men from
civilization.
JOHN G. STOESSINGER, THE REFUGEE AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 3 (1956).
44. Hathaway, supra note 42, at 178.
45. Id. at 132.
46. Jack I. Garvey, Toward a Reformulation of InternationalRefugee Law, 26
HARV. INT'L L.J. 483, 487 (1985).
INTERNATIONAL LAW

47. NORMAN L. ZUCKER & NAOMI FLINK ZUCKER, THE GUARDED GATE: THE
REALITY OF AMERICAN REFUGEE POLICY 49 (1987) (stating that although the preferred

solution is repatriation, "[tihe forces that create refugees-wars, political turmoil, tyrannical and totalitarian regimes-are not easily undone," and thus the refugee cannot be
repatriated until the cause of her flight has been removed.).
48. See generally Andrew E. Shacknove, Who Is a Refugee?, 95 ETHICS 274
(1985) (discussing the commonly accepted variations on the concept of "refugee"). One
of the more important conceptions is that found in the 1969 Convention of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on refugee problems in Africa. The OAU definition restates the U.N. Convention definition and then expands coverage of "refugee" to include:
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination
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under the classic definition without evidence of individual or particu-

larized persecution.4 9 This being so, the need for permanent solutions

to the problem of refugee protection for those fleeing countries in the

Western Hemisphere and seeking refuge in the United States today5" is likely to increase in the years ahead as new crises erupt. The
ad hoc treatment that seemingly characterized the approach Congress took in the 1980s, 61 like the treatment previously accorded
overseas refugees, can no longer suffice.

or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his
country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or
nationality.
Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa, art. 1, entered into force, June 20, 1974, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 47. Of
note, however, is the fact that "African solidarity and mutual assistance in the name of
independence [as] a moral imperative [made] repatriation ... a frequent solution." Astri
Suhrke, Global Refugee Movements and Strategies of Response, in U.S. IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE POLICY: GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC ISSUES 157, 160 (Mary M. Kritz ed.,
1983). This situation is unlikely in Western states. But see Atle Grahl-Madsen, Refugees
and Refugee Law in a World in Transition, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
REFUGEES, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 65, 71 (suggesting that emphasis be
placed on "the humanitarian nature of the act of admitting refugees" and that governments ought to keep the OAU criteria in mind.)
49. Many have advocated an expansion of the classic definition of refugee to include "displaced persons" who are fleeing situations involving external or internal armed
conflicts. See, e.g., Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Toward a Broader Definition of Refugee, 20
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 315, 323-24 (1990).
50. See, e.g., David A. Martin, The End of De Facto Asylum: Toward a Humane
and Realistic Response to Refugee Challenges, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 161 (1987) (Refugees and asylum-seekers are most likely to come from Central America, "a deeply troubled region.").
51. For example, in the mid-eighties legislation was lobbied for, and finally accorded, to grant "safe-haven" legislation specifically to Salvadorans in the Immigration
Act of 1990. More recently, calls for legislation granting safe-haven relief to protect
Haitian nationals in light of the recent controversy surrounding the Bush administration's policy of forced repatriation-at a time of considerable internal strife and violence
in their homeland-emanated from several congresspeople and at least one court of appeals judge. See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8452 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (calling international guarantees "a cruel hoax"
unless Congress enacted legislation ensuring protection). In fact, several bills were introduced in Congress last year to ban forced repatriations of Haitian refugees. See, e.g.,

H.R. 3844, reported in 69

INTERPRETER RELEASES

181, 249-51 (entitled the "Haitian

Refugee Protection Act of 1992," it was "the first congressional response to the Bush
administration's efforts to repatriate Haitians interdicted at sea"). In response to further
government action, other legislative measures to counteract the United States government's policy of forced repatriation have been introduced but, apparently, their passage
during the term of the 102nd Congress was unlikely. See, e.g., 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1236 (1992).

B. The State of Refugee Protection Prior to 1980
1. In General

Historically, refugee movements-largely a European phenomenon occurring in the wake of the Cold War-did not significantly
impact United States refugee law."2 The United States, although a
country of immigration, was not a country of first asylum.6 3 Over the
ensuing years, however, many Western countries, including the
United States, witnessed unprecedented levels of migration from
third world countries.54 In the forty years since the drafting of that
international convention on refugees,56 the concept of refugee and
the problems associated with refugee protection have changed dramatically.56 A survey of the statutory and administrative treatment
accorded refugees and asylum-seekers prior to 1980 reveals the volatile and evolving nature of refugee protection.
2.

The Statutory Treatment of Overseas Refugees

Since the end of World War II, the statutory provisions governing
overseas refugee admissions have changed frequently. 57 Throughout
52.
From the beginning of the twentieth century, civil and religious strife, regional upheavals, war, and repression have driven European refugee movements back and forth across the continent. Much more than the United States
(or Canada), Europeans are accustomed to providing refuge for first asylum
political exiles. However in Western Europe and Canada, as in the United
States, treatment of the newly arriving would-be refugees is controversial. The
safe haven policies and practices developed in other industrialized countries
originate and have evolved in a different historical context, and reflect a different set of expectations from those of the United States.
GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 8, at 55.
53. "First asylum" refers to countries to which large numbers of refugees arrive
directly. See generally Ghoran Melander, Basic Differences in Refugee Policy in Western Europe and North America, 9 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 97, 97-98 (L. Tomasi ed.,
1986).
54. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATION: AN EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE 9 (1990).
55. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 3 (1979).
56. Barry N. Stein, The Nature of the Refugee Problem, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (Alan E. Nash ed.,

1987).
57. For instance, in 1948 Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act, the first important piece of refugee legislation. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat.
1009. For an overview of United States refugee law prior to 1980, see INS v. Stevic, 467
U.S. 407, 414-20 (1984). See also Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 183-84. For a comprehensive discussion of the refugee admissions process prior to the 1980 Act, see generally
GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND
'AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945-PRESENT 1-169 (1986).
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the 1950s, the congressional approach was to enact statutes in response to known refugee problems. 8 Then, in 1956, beginning with
the Hungarian Revolution and continuing until the late seventies after the fall of Saigon, several administrations utilized the Attorney
General's parole power under the regular immigration statute to admit large groups of refugees.5 9 However, this power was used
predominantly to bring
in refugees from communist or communist60
controlled countries.
In 1965, when Congress enacted an immigration measure eliminating the Eurocentric national quota restrictions as part of the regular immigration selection system (a year after the enactment of the
historic Civil Rights legislation),6 Congress also adopted an additional category, popularly called "conditional entry." This measure
provided for a permanent resettlement program for the admission of
refugees from overseas.12 To qualify for admission under this particular refugee assistance program, however, an applicant had to establish that he or she had "fled" persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion in a "Communist or Communist-dominated country" or a "country within the general area of the Middle
East. 63 In other words, geopolitical factors characterized refugee
58. See, e.g., Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400; Act of Sept. 11,
1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639, 643-44; Refugee Fair Share Law, Pub. L. No.
86-648, 74 Stat. 504 (1960).
59. The INA includes a parole provision, which gives the Attorney General the
authorization to parole aliens into this country temporarily for "emergent reasons or for
reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Historically,
parole was used primarily for the admission of large numbers of refugees into the United
States. See generally Nicholas B. Kap, Note, Refugees Under United States Immigration Laws, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 528 (1975) (discussing both parole and conditional
entry of refugees). Currently, there is a statutory prohibition on the use of the Attorney
General's power to parole refugees into the United States unless there are compelling
reasons to do so with respect to a "particular alien." INA § 212(d)(5)(B).
60. See Arthur C. Helton, PoliticalAsylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 MICH. J. L. REF. 243, 248 (1984) (noting that from 1968 through
1980, parole was used to admit 7,150 people from noncommunist countries and 608,365
from communist countries).
61. Congress replaced the national quota restrictions with an immigration preference system based primarily on family reunification and employment categories. For a
detailed discussion of the former immigrant categories under United States law, see
CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE

§

2.17-

2.18 (rev. ed. 1990). In addition to the category of immediate relative status, the basic
two groups of categories were further delineated into six preference groups. A seventh
preference was made available to those seeking entry from abroad as refugees. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911,
913 (amending § 203(a)(7) of the INA).
62. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 709.
63. Id. (citing Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L.

admissions prior to 1980. And although this new category was intended to be a permanent statutory provision to admit refugees on a
more formal basis (replacing the old ad hoc arrangements), it was
numerically limited and linked to regular immigration. Thus, conditional entry of refugees, also known as the "seventh preference,"
eventually proved to be unsatisfactory for refugee admissions
purposes.64
3.

The Administrative Practice of Asylum

In contrast, asylum relief was solely a creature of administrative
regulation prior to 1980.65 No statutory procedure governed the administrative practice available to asylum-seekers already in the
United States before that time.66 Their applications were governed
by regulations promulgated by the INS pursuant to the Attorney
General's authority under the regular immigration statute. 67 Like
the overseas refugee admissions program, those asylum grants were
dominated by ideology, even though the former channels for asylumlike relief were never formally subject to the same limitations. Not
surprisingly, administrative grants of relief were strongly influenced
No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, 913 (amending § 203(a)(7) of the INA)). Also, this new
provision was numerically limited, allowing for only six percent of the annual numerically limited immigration numbers. Id.
64. In the late 1970s, however, Congress began to tire of the use by the executive
branch of the Attorney General's broad parole power under the regular immigration statute to admit large numbers of refugees from overseas. But see Doris M. Meissner, Reflections on the Refugee Act of 1980, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN
THE 1980s 57 (David A. Martin ed., 1986).
Because of the inadequacy of (the conditional entry provision], the Attorney
General's parole authority increasingly came to be used to admit people when
serious refugee crises arose requiring the admission of large numbers. The parole authority at the time gave virtually total discretion to the Attorney General to admit persons to the United States. As such, it provided a highly
flexible, responsive tool for the government to meet urgent humanitarian needs.
Nevertheless, successive Attorneys General uniformly balked at invoking it to
authorize large-scale admission programs. They agonized over whether its use
exceeded the proper scope of executive power, because admission of persons to
the United States has traditionally been a jealously guarded statutory power of
Congress.
Id. at 57-58 (footnote omitted). The time was thus ripe for legislative attention in the
area of refugee law, given the interest of both the Congress and the Carter administration in viable reform measures.
65. INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1524). Regarding pre-1980 asylum procedures, see cases cited in GORDON &
MAILMAN, supra note 61, at § 330,05. For a complete history of the regulatory and
statutory provisions of asylum, see Martin, Reforming Asylum, supra note 14, at 129498.
66. Note, however, that § 243(h) could have been viewed as asylum-like relief.
See Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 563 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984).
67. INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982).

[VOL. 30: 1. 1993]

Asylum Adjudication
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

by cold war politics.68
Prior to 1974, no regulation had afforded an asylum-seeker even
an opportunity to apply for an affirmative grant of asylum while in
the United States. Of particular note in the history of the administrative practice of asylum was a 1970 international incident involving Simas Kudirka, a Lithuanian crewman who had jumped ship
from a Russian vessel that came in contact with the United States
Coast Guard and who sought asylum in the United States. 69 It was a
classic East-West confrontation, and its political and humanitarian
overtones predictably produced media attention and congressional
outrage. 70 This event, seemingly, was the trigger for the establishment of the formal state-side administrative practice of asylum that
was in place from 1974 until 1980.
At the time of the international incident the only statutory provision covering aliens within this country who sought relief on the basis of persecution in their native countries was contained in section
243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA). 71
This statutorily created provision was called "withholding of deportation" (considered to be an asylum-like provision) and provided for
the nonreturn of an alien to a country where the alien was likely to
be persecuted "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion" in the exercise of
the Attorney General's discretion.7 2 Although this provision had
been in place since 1952, it was unavailable to Kudirka because his
68. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 732 ("With respect to the asylum-type relief available prior to 1980, successful asylum claimants were, in overwhelming proportions, refugees from communist countries.").
69. See David Roth, Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Immigration Law, U. FLA. L. REV. 539, 545 (1981) (indicating that the 1970 incident known as
the Kudirka affair "dramatized the need to reform asylum procedures"); Christopher T.
Hanson, Note, Behind The Paper Curtain: Asylum Policy Versus Asylum Practice, 7
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 107, 107 (1978).
70. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 733 ("More significant changes in
the actual implementation of political asylum protections came in the wake of the
Kudirka incident in 1970.").
71. See INA § 243(h)(1) (1991). The provision that had been in place since 1952
gave the Attorney General discretion to withhold the deportation (or return) of aliens
subject to persecution. "Section 203(e) of the Refugee Act of 1980 amended the language of § 243(h), basically conforming it to the language of Art. 33 of the United
Nations Protocol." INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 421 (1984). However, "section 243(h),
both prior to and after amendment, makes no mention of the term 'refugee'; rather, any
alien within the United States is entitled to withholding if he meets the standard set
forth." Id. at 422. Furthermore, the changes made to this section were not considered to
be substantive in nature but rather just a conforming amendment "for the sake of clarity." Id. at 428.
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970). See generally INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
17

request for political asylum did not arise in the context of a deportation proceeding. 3 Furthermore, no formal apparatus-administrative or otherwise-was in place to grant Kudirka
political asylum affirmatively. As a result of this gap in statutory and
administrative coverage, the Lithuanian crewman was returned to
the RussiansZ 4 In the wake of this international incident, the Nixon
administration launched a major review of the political asylum apparatus. Eventually formal immigration regulations were promulgated
in 1974, providing for affirmative asylum relief to foreign nationals
applying'while in the United States.7
4. The Prelude to Legislative Reform
Such was the availability of state-side asylum relief and refugee
resettlement from abroad prior to the enactment of the legislative
reform measure that later became known as the Refugee Act of
1980. The inability of the 1965 statutory arrangement of conditional
entry to provide more comprehensive relief for overseas refugee assistance, together with the executive branch's dissatisfaction with its
efforts to respond quickly to the growing refugee emergencies, forged
a partnership in the legislative arena that led to the enactment of the
new refugee law in 1980.
The Refugee Act proposal presented Congress with an opportunity
to curtail the executive branch's plenary power under the immigration laws to admit refugees from abroad without accountability or
legislative oversight. The Refugee Act proposal, also presented the
executive branch with higher numerical ceilings to deal with refugee
emergencies than had been afforded under the old seventh preference. During the enactment process, Congress and the executive
branch thus "struggled to find a statutory framework that would
provide a reasonable degree of control and predictability, while at
the same
time retaining adequate flexibility to respond to new
7
crises.1 6

73. In other words, the former version of § 243(h) of the Act was only applicable
to an alien unlawfully within the United States who was in a deportation proceeding.
Stevic, 467 U.S. at 415 (citing Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958)).
74. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 733.
75. See 8 C.F.R. § 108 (1976). Note also that this process eventually resulted in
formal regulations and guidelines. The INS regulations, issued in 1974, were the first to
spell out in detail the procedures to be followed when applying for political asylum.
76. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 694.
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II. THE LEGAL FOUNDATION: COMPONENTS OF UNITED STATES
ASYLUM LAW

A.

The Refugee Act of 1980
1. In General

The Refugee Act," the first comprehensive piece of refugee legislation, created order out of the piecemeal treatment that had previously governed the statutory provisions of refugee protection and the
formal administrative practice of asylum relief.1 8 The Refugee Act
thus brought permanent and systematic statutory treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers under United States immigration laws,
amending the INA. 9
The emphasis on order and accountability in the overseas statutory scheme is instructive as to whether Congress would have intended that asylum be an open-ended procedure without the
necessary controls currently in place under the overseas refugee program. Further, the executive branch had informed the legislators
that the statutory proposal did not differ substantially from the administrative practice for asylum already in place. 80 Many observers
have since acknowledged that asylum was a legislative afterthought.
Notwithstanding the lack of attention legislators paid to the asylum
provisions, the Refugee Act did establish for the first time formal
statutory procedures for adjudicating asylum claims of persons inside
United States borders.8 ' Concerning asylum relief, this statutory
provision is probably the single most important aspect of the Refugee Act next to the neutral standard that governs eligibility for refugee status.
77. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 103 (1980).
78. See generally Deborah E. Anker & Michael Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 11-19, 30-62
(1981); see also John A. Scanlan, Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives and
Obligations Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 618, 619-20
(1981).
79. See generally Anker & Posner, supra note 78.
80. See, e.g., Asylum Adjudications:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4,
6-7 (1982) (testimony of Doris M. Meissner, Acting Commissioner, INS).
81. Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 103 (adding INA §§ 101(a)(42),
207-209, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-59).

2.

The Statutory Framework

In adopting the United Nations Convention definition of "refugee," the Refugee Act repealed the old, numerically and geopolitically limited conditional-entry category,82 thus establishing a
uniform, neutral standard for refugee status under the two statutorily created programs of political asylum and overseas refugee resettlement.8 3 Although Congress clearly intended this non-ideological
standard to be compatible with the humanitarian traditions and international obligations of the United States, all who qualified as refugees-regardless of the specific program-were not intended to be
accorded affirmative immigration status.8 4
The Refugee Act therefore established, primarily, a systematic
procedure for determining the number of refugees to be admitted
each year under new section 207 of the INA.85 Refugee admissions
from overseas are accomplished through a consultative process involving the legislative and executive branches.8 6 Not all who meet
the statutory definition of "refugee" are to be considered eligible for
admission to the United States, however.8 7 Moreover, the executive
branch is explicitly prohibited from using the Attorney General's
parole power to admit refugees, thus closing "the [pre-1980] refugee-parole loophole permanently by adding subparagraph (B) to
82. Id. (codified at various sections of titles 8 and 22 of the United States Code).
See INA §§ 101(a)(42), 207, 209 (the current provisions that govern overseas refugee
programs). Also note that a preeminent purpose of the Refugee Act was the elimination
of geopolitical restrictions on the admission of refugees. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. 1, 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141; H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 144, 160.
83. Helton, supra note 60, at 250-52. As noted in the introduction:
Three years after the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, its mandate that
uniform and neutral standards be utilized in the asylum adjudication process
remains unfulfilled. Rather, the Act's mandate is subservient to foreign and
domestic policy considerations which continue to dominate asylum decisionmaking.
84. See generally, Anker & Posner, supra note 78.
85. Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 103 § 201(b); INA § 207, 8
U.S.C. § 1157 (1982). The Refugee Act, in effect, "established a third broad admission
structure governed by a decision-making system quite different from quota immigration
and the numerically unlimited system for immediate relatives." ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN,
supra note 24, at 710.
86. See INA § 207(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). As Professors
Aleinikoff and Martin note:
The Refugee Act repealed the old, numerically limited seventh preference in
its entirety. It had become apparent that a single fixed ceiling, applicable every
year, simply would not fit the variable needs created by the rise and fall of
refugee flows. At the same time, congressional drafters were unwilling to leave
refugee admissions totally ungoverned by numerical limits in some systematic
fashion.
ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 710.
87. Each year the President, exercising a power specifically delegated by Congress,
announces how many of these refugees will be admitted into the United States. Id. at
711.
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§ 212(d)(5).

'

Refugees admitted pursuant to this statutory
scheme have usually awaited their turn in internationally sponsored
refugee camps in countries of first asylum while the United States
government processed their applications. On the other hand, the
in-state asylum program permits the processing of claims of asylumseekers already physically present in the United States, notwithstanding their illegal entry or unlawful status at the time of
application.8 9
In that regard, the Refugee Act added a new section 208 to the
INA, 90 providing for refugee protection and establishing what
amounted to a new immigration status, "asylee," to be made available outside the regular system of immigration preferences. 91 Like the
overseas program, this particular statutory scheme does not contemplate that all who qualify will be accorded asylee status. 92 After
88. Id. at 350 ("That provision forbids the paroling of refugees except in isolated
individual cases for individually compelling reasons.").
89. INA §§ 208, 209, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1159 (1990). Moreover, the mere filing
of a nonfrivolous asylum claim affords an opportunity for authorized employment in the
United States. The program was once called "the brass ring in the immigration merrygo-round." Schuck, supra note 24, at 10 (citing Diaz v. INS, 648 F. Supp. 638 (E.D.
Cal. 1986)). Obtaining employment authorization pending an asylum application is critical in light of the comparatively recent employer sanctions. David A. Martin, The End
of De Facto Asylum: Toward a Humane and Realistic Response to Refugee Challenges,
18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 161, 162 (1987-1988). Also, the employment authorization lasts
through the administrative and judicial appeals process. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.12(c)(8),
274a.13(a) (1992). With the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of title 8 of the United States Code) (popularly known as the Simpson-Rodino
Act), however, employers can no longer hire undocumented aliens with impunity. See
INA § 274 (1986), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (Supp. 1987) (amended 1986) (IRCA's employer
sanctions provisions). For an overview of IRCA and the employer sanctions provisions,
see DAVID A. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION LAW 109-29 (Federal Judicial
Center, 1987).
90. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
91. "The Refugee Act of 1980 established a new statutory procedure for granting
asylum to refugees." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427 (1987). Successful
asylum applicants are called "asylees" in the INS regulations promulgated to implement
the statutory asylum provisions, 8 C.F.R. pt. 208 (1990). ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra
note 24, at 734-35.
92. As noted by the Supreme Court in the landmark decision INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987):
It is important to note that the Attorney General is not required to grant asylum to everyone who meets the definition of refugee. Instead, a finding that an
alien is a refugee does no more than establish that "the alien may be granted
asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General."
Id. at 428 n.5 (emphasis added).
In addition, the Court quoted House Report No. 608, supra note 82, on this particular
issue as follows:
The Committee carefully considered arguments that the new definition might

eligibility for political asylum has been established, asylee status
may be granted only at the Attorney General's discretion. When applicants demonstrate that they have a "well-founded fear of persecution" on account of one of the enumerated categories if returned to
their homelands, however, discretion is rarely denied in current practice.9 3 Thus, in contrast to refugees admitted under the overseas program, successful asylum applicants (i.e., those who demonstrate their
refugee status) are accorded lawful immigration status (i.e.,
"asylee") without having to await "their turn in line."94 Even though
few applicants have been granted asylee status, deportation of asy-

lum-seekers is rare, thus creating the potential for a new class of
immigrants not currently authorized under the INA.95
The Refugee Act also transformed the old section 243(h),98 the
"withholding of deportation" provision discussed above, from discretionary to mandatory to assure its compliance with the United States
treaty obligation of nonrefoulement.97 Although the language of this
expand the numbers of refugees eligible to come to the United States and force
substantially greater refugee admissions than the country could absorb. However, merely because an individual or group comes within the definition will not
guarantee resettlement in the United States.
Id. at 444. But the House Report was still focused on the overseas program and thus
failed to consider a situation in which an expansive definition might attract large numbers of potential asylum-seekers who may be denied asylum and remain to become a part
of yet another undocumented group of aliens in need of lawful immigration status. In the
case of the Salvadorans, Congress passed safe-haven legislation, discussed infra, to accord them lawful status temporarily.
93. As Professors Aleinikoff and Martin note, some observers feared that discretionary denials of asylum to eligible asylum-seekers would increase. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 799 (citing Deborah E. Anker & Carolyn P. Blum, New Trends in
Asylum Jurisprudence: The Aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in INS v,
Cardoza-Fonseca, 1 INT'L J. REF. L. 67 (1989)). However, such was not the case when
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) revisited this issue. See supra note 126.
94. The potential for permanent residence in the United States after one year as
an asylee is available as well, although not automatically, as with the overseas program.
Compare INA § 209(a) (overseas refugee program) with INA § 209(b) (political asylum
program).
95. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN-FEw DENIED APPLICANTS DEPORTED 3 (1987).

96. INA § 243(h), Pub. L. No. 96-212, Tit. II, 94 Stat. 107 § 203(e) (Mar. 17,
1980).
97. As amended by the Refugee Act, the INA provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
INA § 243(h)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). The "withholding"
remedy is mandatory for aliens who prove that deportation would threaten their lives or
freedom on account of any of the same five grounds set forth in the INA refugee definition under § 101(A)(42). See INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (providing that the
Attorney General "shall" withhold deportation of persons proving statutory eligibility).
The Refugee Act transformed § 243(h) into a mandatory provision, albeit "country-specific." Also, although technically called requests for "withholding of deportation," such
requests are considered, and actually are, requests for asylum. In re Salim, 18 I. & N.
Dec. 311 (BIA 1982); ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 665. For disqualifying
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amended provision differs slightly from that found in section 208(a),
the difference is merely a matter of degree. Those seeking asylum
relief under the current statutory scheme would ordinarily present
the same evidentiary proof that is needed to qualify for withholding
of deportation.
Significantly, however, the standard of proof for withholding of
deportation relief under section 243(h) is greater than that required
for establishing eligibility for asylum relief under section 208. This
difference in the quantum of proof is the result of case law development, which is discussed more fully below. The standards of evidentiary proof therefore differ depending on the particular type of relief
claimed, even though the same evidence is used for both claims.
Nonetheless, in asylum cases, the applicant need only establish a
"well-founded fear of persecution," which is considered to be a more
lenient standard than the restrictive "clear probability" of persecution that the applicant must establish to "withhold" his or her
deportation.
In any event, for those asylum-seekers applying within the United
States (or at a port of entry or land border), two provisions under
the regular immigration statute accord refugee protection. Either
section 208 or section 243(h)(1), or both, are available to an alien
who fears persecution. 98 In fact, under the appropriate regulations,
an asylum claim is treated as including a request for relief under the
withholding provision.9 9 Ultimately, which persons are accorded asylum or withholding under the pertinent INA provision depends in
large measure on the degree of persuasiveness of the evidentiary

conditions, see INA § 243(h)(2)(A)-(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A)-(D) (1988 & Supp.
11 1990).
98. Note that formerly "withholding" relief could only be sought in deportation
proceedings. However, under the new asylum regulations, all applications for asylum are
also treated as applications for withholding. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.3(b), 208.4 (1992).
Also, an asylee is given an indefinite right to remain in the United States and, at the end
of one year in asylee status, may apply for permanent residence. INA § 209, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1159; 8 C.F.R. § 208.22 (1991). In contrast, persons granted withholding are given
only the right not to be deported to a specific country for as long as the threat of persecution lasts; a grant of withholding does not allow for permanent resettlement in the United
States, and the person may be deported at any time to a third country where no threat of
persecution exists, although that rarely happens. See INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h); 8 C.F.R. § 208.22 (1992).
Other aspects of asylum and withholding are similar. Applicants for both forms of
relief may be granted interim employment authorization while their applications are
pending. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1992). Both asylees and persons granted withholding are
automatically granted employment authorization. 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 (1991).
99. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3 (1992).

proof presented at a hearing on the claims.10 0

B.

The Regulatory Scheme
1. In General

Comparatively few applications for asylum were being filed at the
time of enactment of the Refugee Act. 01 Because asylum was considered less important than the overseas program, the Refugee Act
essentially codified (or rather deferred to) the regulatory scheme for
asylum adjudications that had existed since the aftermath of the
Kudirka incident in the seventies. As noted above, little attention
was paid to the enactment of the statutory provisions governing asylum. Thus, there was no awareness or concern that the statutorily
created process might eventually disrupt the overall scheme of orderly admissions under the regular immigration system then in
place. Consequently, asylum-seekers who managed to enter the
United States lawfully or otherwise, or apply at United States borders after 1980, could rely on statutory authority for the adjudication of their claims. Not long after the measure's passage, however,
the asylum situation changed dramatically. All involved in the process of asylum adjudications soon recognized the inadequacy of the
statutory scheme established for the in-state treatment of asylum
applications.
2.

The Process Post-Enactment

For the first ten years after the passage of the Refugee Act, interim regulations0 2 governed the asylum adjudicatory process. In
1990, the Department of Justice issued final asylum regulations, after holding them in abeyance for nearly three years. 10 3 Principally,
the cause for delay was the proposed elimination of the role of the
100. See, e.g., Derek C. Smith & Bruce A. Hake, Evidence Issues in Asylum
Cases, IMMIGRA. BRIEFINGS 26-32 (Oct. 1990).
101. Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 184, 184 n.11.
102. Notably, the interim regulations, published shortly after the passage of the
Refugee Act, remained in effect until the final regulations, originally published in 1987,
became effective in 1990.
103. 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a), 55 Fed. Reg. at 30680 (1990). These regulations were
delayed after they were first issued in 1987 due to an uproar over the "two bites of the
apple" issue, which involved the removal of the immigration judges from the adjudication
process. See generally Arthur C. Helton, The ProposedAsylum Rules: An Analysis, 64
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1070-80 (1987). Although judicial review in the federal courts
remained available to unsuccessful applicants, immigration judges are not a part of the
enforcement-minded INS. Immigration judges are considered independent adjudicators
who conduct more formal evidentiary-type hearings in which the asylum applicant may
be represented by counsel at his or her expense. On the other hand, affirmative administrative procedures before an asylum officer are likely to be less formal, nonadversarial
interviews at which counsel for the alien may or may not participate fully.
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immigration courts in deciding asylum cases.' The new asylum regulations, which became effective on October 1, 1990, have received,
for the most part, favorable commentary. 1 5 However, the problem
of asylum does not lie with the recently promulgated regulations, although the delay in issuance of their final form may have contributed to the presenft considerable backlog of asylum applications.
Prior to the enactment of the 1980 refugee law, less than 2000
asylum applications were being filed annually. 06 One month after
the Refugee Act was signed into law, approximately 125,000 Cubans
107
participating in the Mariel boatlift began to arrive in Florida.

Over the years, the number of applications increased exponentially.
In the early 1980s, the number of annual asylum applications rose to
almost 50,000.108 Today the number of asylum applications is in the
hundreds of thousands. Few persons denied asylum are being de-

ported. 0 Undoubtedly, the dramatic increase in asylum applications
over the pre-Refugee Act numbers was cause for alarm among administration officials, who viewed this new form of lawful immigration status as a vehicle for aliens intent on abusing the process by

filing "frivolous claims to forestall return to their home countries.

'110

Some consider this view both alarmist and inaccurate. It is neverthe-

less true that the number of asylum-seekers is likely to increase
rather than decrease over time, with a potential effect of disrupting

the regulated immigration process.

104.
105.

Smith & Hake, supra note 100, at 3 n.19.
See generally Arthur C. Helton, Final Asylum Rules: Finally, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 789-794 (1990). These new asylum regulations will be discussed more
fully infra in Part III.
106. See Meissner, supra note 64, at 60. Note that this number was considered
"an all-time high, in the system at that time." Id.
107. Id. See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Comhunity
Ties". A Response to Martin, 44 U. PIT. L. REV. 237, 253 (1983).
108. Id.
109. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 95.
110. Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 185. Another concern that "[t]his extraordinary
increase in the number of pending asylum claims" posed to the administration, in addition to the filing of frivolous claims, was the possibility that they "may seriously tax
procedures established for a far smaller flow. The overburdening of the process may result in substantial delays and proceedings that threaten the accuracy of the determinations." Id. Administration critics, in contesting the administration's view, contended that
yet another concern about the present process was "the accuracy and fairness of the
decision-making process." Id. This particular concern has been largely addressed by the
1990 implementation of the new asylum regulations.

3.

The Ramifications of Immigration

The regulation of immigration is an area of public law within the

plenary power of the sovereign. 11 When Congress enacted the Refugee Act, the new law was incorporated into the 1952 immigration
112
statute, which regulates the entry and expulsion of noncitizens.

Even the structure of congressional committees assigned refugee

matters reflects a preoccupation with immigration. l" Indeed, the bipartisan Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy-a
blue ribbon commission formed over a decade ago to study and report on these issues-could not complete its undertaldng without due

consideration
of the interrelationship between these two areas of the
4
law.

111. "[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [the admission and expulsion of aliens]." Oceanic Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909). See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration
Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 255. See
also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892):
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has
the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to preservation, to forbid
the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. In the United
States, this power is vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control of international relations, in peace as well
as in war. It belongs to the political department of the government ....
Id. at 659. For commentary critical of the plenary power doctrine in immigration law,
see Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862-63 (1987). See also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY 177-222 (1987).
112. "[I]t must follow that if Congress has deemed it necessary to impose particular restrictions on the coming in of aliens ... it follows that the constitutional right of
Congress to enact such legislation is the sole measure [of] ...its validity .... ." Oceanic
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 340 (1909). See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787 (1977) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)) (recognizing that the
Court had recently observed "that in the exercise of its broad power over immigration
and naturalization, 'Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.' ").
113. For example, the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on immigration
is called the House Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration and Refugees. 70
INTERPRETER RELEASES 58 (1993). The subcommittee's chairman is Rep. Romano L.
Mazzoli (D-Ky.). The Senate immigration subcommittee, chaired by Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy (D-Mass.), is called the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs. Id.
As international law has moved in this century "from an essentially negative
code of rules of abstention to positive rules of cooperation," its potential overlap with domestic statutory regimes has become pronounced. Even a partial list
of recent international concerns-gender and race discrimination, restrictive
business practices, environmental protection, and labor rights-suggests the extent to which the international community may attempt to regulate matters
that historically have been the exclusive subject of domestic legislation.
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1111 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
114. Public Law 95-412, passed on October 5, 1978, established the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy "to study and evaluate ... existing laws,
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Asylum is therefore highly anomalous. It is, after all, the only basis for obtaining lawful permanent status outside the regular system
of immigration selection, exclusive of refugee admissions under the
overseas refugee program. 115 Professor David Martin has appropriately called asylum the "wild card" of immigration,'a "loophole" in
the regular system of family and occupational preferences, creating
"backdoor immigration."" 6 Although intended as a discretionary
policies, and procedures governing the admission of immigrants and refugees to the
United States and to make such administrative and legislative recommendations to the
President and to the Congress as are appropriate." SELECT COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE POLICY, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST (1981).

Indeed, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy offered several
suggestions on the subject of future "mass first asylum" situations:
Until 1980, the U.S. experience with asylum consisted of infrequent requests
from individuals or small groups, which generally met with favorable public
reaction. Then, last year, the sudden, mass arrival of [125,000] Cubans seeking
asylum, added to the continuing arrival of Haitian boats, resulted in national
dismay, consternation and confusion. Considering the possible recurrence of
mass first asylum situations and the exponential growth in new asylum applicants other than Cubans and Haitians, the Select Commission has made a series of recommendations as to how the United States should attempt to manage
such emergencies. These recommendations stem from the view of most Commissioners that:
* The United States, in keeping with the Refugee Act of 1980, will remain a country of asylum for those fleeing oppression.
* The United States should adopt policies and procedures which will deter the illegal migration of those who are not likely to meet the criteria for
acceptance as asylees. Therefore, asylee policy and programs must be formulated to prevent the use of asylum petitions for "backdoor
immigration."
* The United States must process asylum claims on an individual basis
as expeditiously as possible and not hesitate to deport those persons who
come to U.S. shores-even when they come in large numbers-who do not
meet the established criteria for asylees.
Id. at 165 (citation omitted).
115. Because of the ability to control how many are admitted under the overseas
program, this aspect of refugee protection is not viewed as aberrational to the regular
immigration system. Much like those awaiting visa availability under the ordinary system of immigration, refugees must likewise await their turn.
116. Martin, The Refugee Act, supra note 14, at 112. See also Schuck, supra note
24, at 8-9.
Asylum claims were the new wild cards in the deck. Aliens with no real
chance of gaining legal admission to the United States might get a foot in the
door by filing for asylum. Few could meet the law's requirement that they show
a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." But virtually
anyone (especially with a lawyer) could hope to delay formal expulsion long
enough-certainly for months often for years-to gain some other form of relief or to melt into the large clandestine world of undocumented aliens. Asylum
claimants thus had everything to gain and nothing to lose.

form of relief, in actual practice asylum is rarely denied once eligibility has been established. 17 However, the sovereign's plenary
power has the potential for trumping asylum in "the immigration
deck of cards" 1 8 if the numbers continue to overwhelm the orderliness of the process and Congress elects to act.11 9

Determining who and how many are permitted to enter and remain as members of the body politic are decisions that go to the very
heart of a nation's identity and the concept of statehood. 20 While it
seems inevitable that restrictive immigration policies will hamper the
goal of protecting asylum-seekers, the issue must be addressed. The
intersection of immigration law and refugee policy is unavoidable.
4. The Unfulfilled Promise
The passage of the new refugee law was hailed as a significant
milestone in human rights, a promise of fair and equitable treatment
for all refugees without any geopolitical biases. 2 ' But complicating
matters in the asylum debate is the widely held view that the present
system is politically biased, compromising the intended goal of neutrality in the adjudication process.122 Although the current United
Id. (footnote omitted).
117. Moreover, even though a person may be denied asylum, it is unlikely that he
or she will ever be deported. Thus, as has happened in the past, the passage of special
legislation to correct the problem-such as the Cuban-Haitian entrants classification in
the mid-eighties-is a distinct possibility. This type of legislation would be necessary to
accord lawful status to individuals who have managed to rebuild their lives in the United
States after arriving or entering without lawful status. See IRCA § 202 (uncodified) (as
amended by Pub. L. No. 100-525 § 2(i), 102 Stat. 2609 (Oct. 24, 1988)) (permitting
those qualifying as Cuban-Haitian entrants to adjust to permanent resident status). For
earlier forms of similar relief for those previously admitted as refugees under the executive branch's parole power, see Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419
(providing for adjustment of status of Hungarians); Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89732, 80 Stat. 1161 (providing similar adjustment opportunities for the earlier arrival of
Cubans).
118. Martin, The Refugee Act, supra note 14, at 112.
119. The 103rd Congress may yet pass comprehensive legislation in the area of
asylum reform. The House Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees recently held a hearing on three bills (H.R. 1153, H.R. 1355, and H.R. 1679)
involving asylum and immigration pre-inspection processes. See generally 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 581-87 (1993). The Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs plans to hold hearings later this year on various asylum issues. Id. at 352.
120. See generally David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: PoliticalAsylum and Beyond, 44 U. PiTT. L. REv. 165 (1983).
121. The legislative history of the Refugee Act is replete with praise for its humanitarian purposes. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1980); S.
REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 19 (1980). See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 432-33 (1987); Anker & Posner, supra note 78, at 11-12.
122. Arthur C. Helton, Ecumenical Municipal and Legal Challenges to United
States Refugee Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493, 496 (1986). See also Note,
Political Bias in United States Refugee Policy Since the Refugee Act of 1980, 1 GEo.
IMMIGR. L.J. 495 (1986).
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States definition did indeed eliminate the previous geopolitical biases, old habits die hard. 123 Thus, achieving the "humanitarian ideal
to which our nation has been historically committed ... has unfortu-

nately proven elusive and controversial.' 1 24 The Refugee Act's declaration of purpose does emphasize this country's historic policy of

responding to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in
their homelands. However, this stated purpose is more consistent

with "preserving special access for refugees [from abroad]' 1 25 than
affording new immigration opportunities for asylum-seekers inside
the United States.
Furthermore, in what is perceived by some as an effort to further
emasculate congressional intent in this area, a number of commentators have charged that the tendency to construe the statutory
grounds for eligibility narrowly is an affront to the generosity Congress intended when it enacted the Refugee Act. Yet a narrow construction of the qualifying terms is not necessarily inconsistent with
the humanitarian goals Congress intended when it eliminated the
geopolitical grounds that previously governed United States refugee
policy. Arguably, they are different considerations. Although Congress did indeed intend a generous policy toward refugees admitted

from overseas, it is unlikely that Congress intended a statutory
scheme for processing claims in-state to be used to process large

numbers of asylum applications without any built-in constraints. On
the contrary, by leaving the granting of asylum to agency discretion,
123. For example, critics point to the relative ease with which asylum-seekers from
Eastern Europe and Cuba have traditionally been granted asylum compared to the extremely low rates of asylum grants for Haitians and Salvadorans. Helton, supra note 60.
More recently, a congressional witness observed at a House Subcommittee hearing on
immigration housekeeping matters, calling the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 a 'Cold
War relic," that "[flor 30 years the Act is a monument to what this country will do
when foreign policy considerations take precedents." 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 671
(1992). For a critical review of United States refugee policy, see LOESCHER & SCANLAN,
supra note 57.
Pursuing policies forged in the crucible of the cold war, the United States has
grown accustomed to regarding only the opponents of Communism as deserving of rescue. In the current restrictionist era, that belief has translated into an
asylum policy totally at variance with the spirit of America's refugee law, and
totally alien to the belief that refugees are desperate people not pawns in a
global game of chess with the Soviet Union.
Id. at 219; see also ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 47, at 48-96 (1987).
124. Meissner, supra note 64, at 58-59.

125.

GALLAGHER ET AL.,

supra note 8, at 3. At the least, it is consistent with a

dominant characteristic of United States immigration policy that has existed since the
pre-World War II period, when many political exiles from Nazi Germany were thereby
excluded from entry. Id.

Congress no doubt intended the exercise of this discretion as a suitable restraint. However, in practice, discretionary denials are rare.
Another approach is therefore necessary to address the growing concern about numbers and ensure the orderly processing of bona fide
asylum claims. Ultimately this means that clear definitions of the
qualifying grounds for relief must be spelled out legislatively.
The Refugee Act contemplated the granting of asylum on a discretionary basis only.' 26 In other words, the Act meant to provide a
formal statutory procedure for the adjudication of a small number of
asylum claims made by individuals already physically present in the
United States. 1 27 Not unexpectedly, perhaps, the broad and somewhat malleable language of the definitional standards has generated
a significant amount of litigation and numerous court decisions on
the subject. 12 8
C.

Case Law Development
1. In General

Although, in passing the Refugee Act, Congress was specific about
establishing a neutral standard for determining refugee status, it
provided few decision-making guidelines to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the agency charged with the Act's implementation. This cursory approach is consistent with the scant attention paid to asylum during the legislative process-in part, no doubt,
126. In practice, establishing eligibility for asylum virtually guarantees that asylum status will be granted. See In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1987) (overruling
In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982), which placed too much emphasis on the
asylum applicant's manner of entry in circumvention of orderly refugee procedures). See
also In re Soleimani, Interim Dec. No. 3118 (BIA 1989) (which "further continued a
trend toward permitting favorable exercises of discretion in increasingly diverse circumstances." ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 775).
127. As noted by the Supreme Court, "[t]he principal motivation for the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980 was a desire to revise and regularize the procedures
governing the admission of refugees into the United States." INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, 425 (1984). The Court further concluded that
[t]he primary substantive change Congress intended to make under the Refugee Act ... was to eliminate the piecemeal approach to admission of refugees
previously existing under § 203(a)(7) and § 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, and § 108 of the regulations, and to establish a systematic
scheme for admission and resettlement of refugees.
Id. (citing to S. REP. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1979); H.R. REP. No. 96-608,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1979)). See also Meissner, supra note 64, at 60.
Regulations for treating political asylum requests by persons already in this
country had existed for some years. As they had no explicit statutory base, it
seemed tidy to add language to the Act providing the requisite authority.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
128. Indeed, as Professors Aleinikoff and Martin so aptly observe, "This language
gives rise to immensely rich controversies over meaning and implementation."
ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 696.
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because the asylum issues prominent today were not so apparent
then.12 9 In creating the statutory scheme, then, the legislators expected relatively few claims to be adjudicated. As with other claims
for immigration benefits, a case-by-case development of the law was
understood to be a suitable approach for adjudication. Providing
content to the governing language of the Refugee Act was therefore
left to the agency and, ultimately, to the courts to complete. This
adjudicatory approach to the processing of asylum claims consumed
the better part of the last decade.
2.

The First Generation of Asylum Cases

The first generation of asylum cases addressed essentially the pro30
Prior to the Sucedural aspects of United States refugee law.1
13 1
commentators and the
preme Court's first ruling in this area,
lower courts had grappled with the possibility of relaxing the evidentiary standard of proof in withholding of deportation cases in light of

the passage of the Refugee Act.13 2 As noted earlier, 33 the Refugee
Act had transformed the withholding of deportation provision into a
mandatory requirement upon the requisite showing of the threshold

criteria. Despite contentions that the Refugee Act mandated a less

stringent standard, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) continued to require those applicants seeking withholding of their deportation to establish their claims by a "clear probability of
129. Initially, the concern focused on the number of applications, which was increasing exponentially. Then years of litigation over the differing standards of evidentiary
proof between asylum and withholding claims ensued. Although asylum advocates won
that battle, the war still rages on. Now the dichotomy between procedural and substantive aspects of asylum relief seems to hold center court, specifically the meaning of the
phrase "on account of ...political opinion."
130. For examples of the first generation of asylum cases that dealt with procedures and standards of proof, see Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 6 (citing to INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407 (1984); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 614 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1980)).
131. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
132. Prior to 1980, withholding under § 243(h) of the INA was the only asylumlike relief available to would-be asylum-seekers. However, that relief was then available
only in a deportation hearing. Also, prior to 1968 (when the United States acceded to the
U.N. Protocol), it was clear that an alien in the context of a deportation hearing was
required to demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution" or a "likelihood of persecution" to be eligible for withholding of deportation under § 243(h) of the INA. INS v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1984). When Congress enacted the Refugee Act in 1980,
some commentators urged that this new refugee law intended a more lenient standard of
proof for withholding.
133. See supra note 97.

persecution."' 134 INS v. Stevic,135 in 1984, thus presented the Supreme Court with its first occasion to address this issue of statutory
interpretation under the 1980 Act. 36 To the surprise of most knowledgeable observers, the Court's unanimous decision in Stevic deviated from the commonplace understanding the observers and the
circuit courts shared about the uniformity of the governing standard
under asylum and withholding. 3 7 Nonetheless, the Court concluded
that it found no support "in either the language of section 243(h),
the structure. of the amended Act, or the legislative history" that
Congress intended those qualified for "refugee" status under section
208 to be entitled also to withholding of deportation under section
243(h).138
In 1987, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca39 afforded the Court an opportunity to answer definitively the important issue left open in the earlier Stevic case, namely whether a lesser standard of proof governed
claims under section 208 of the INA. During the interim between
the two Supreme Court decisions, the BIA concluded that "as a
practical matter" the two standards (i.e., for asylum and withholding
of deportation claims) converged.' " ° This time, however, the Court's
six-to-three decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, a landmark asylum case,

134. The "clear probability of persecution" standard was initially established as "a
criterion governing the exercise of the discretion given to the Attorney General by the
original wording of § 243(h)" in the early 1950s. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note
24, at 742. After the United States accession to the U.N. Protocol in 1968, many argued
that the BIA was required to relax that criterion. Id. In In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec.
310 (BIA 1973), the BIA disagreed, holding that the treaty worked no change in the
governing standards. Id. The passage of the Refugee Act marked the renewal of this
argument. Id.
135. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
136. For applicants seeking relief under § 243(h), the Court settled on a stricter
standard of proof to govern withholding claims. Id. at 424-28. These cases are governed
by the "clear probability" standard. Specifically, the Court determined that Congress
had not intended, in enacting the Refugee Act, to apply a more lenient standard of proof
in these types of cases (i.e., the mandatory form of refugee protection). Id.
137. ALEINIKOFI & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 741; see also Bolanos-Hernandez
v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1321 n.10 (9th Cir. 1984) (listing pre-Stevic cases treating both
standards as identical).
138. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 428. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987),
the Court observed that its reasoning in Stevic was "based in large part on the plain
language of § 243(h)" of the INA. Id. at 430. In dicta, however, the Stevic Court intimated that the governing standard under § 208 was more generous than the one applicable to § 243(h) claims. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 425.
139. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). For an overview of this case, see Craig Sherman, Recent Development, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 482 (1987).
140. In In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), the BIA surveyed the
disparate court of appeals decisions that had predictably followed immediately after
Stevic. In its decision, the BIA announced a unitary standard for determining § 208
claims because "the facts in asylum and withholding cases do not produce clearcut instances in which such fine distinctions can be meaningfully made." Id. at 229.
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definitively settled the hotly debated
issue in finding the two stan' '141
dards "significantly different.
In Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca,the Court did indeed settle the
question of the appropriate standards of proof for establishing the
threshold qualifications for protection from persecution under sections 208 and 243(h) of the INA. However, the Court's decision, in
effect, nullified the need for seeking relief under section 243(h) in
recognizing a more lenient standard of proof under section 208.142
Furthermore, the Court left open for further case-by-case adjudication the specific contours of the more generous evidentiary standard
governing asylum claims. This approach predictably prompted more
litigation. 14 3 Initially, the 4BIA responded by employing a favorable
"reasonable person" test. 4 However, not long after, critics and
141. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 448 n.31 (1987). Although in dicta the Court
in Stevic had suggested the answer to this question, the BIA and circuit courts were still
undecided about the appropriate application of a standard for asylum cases. See Stevic,
467 U.S. at 424-25. Thus, in contrast to the withholding standard, the applicant for
asylum need only establish a reasonable possibility of persecution on one of the five enumerated grounds. In Cardoza-Fonseca,the Court concluded that in choosing the phrase
"well-founded fear of persecution," governing the asylum provisions, Congress intended a
more generous standard for deciding asylum relief. Because of the evidentiary proof
problems associated with establishing persecution, asylum relief has become the most
favored form of establishing entitlement to refugee protection. In practice, the same type
of evidence would be used to establish either claim.
142. At first there was real concern that the Court's decision left open a "troubling
gap" in the law, which would permit the return of someone who had established "refugee" status under the more lenient standard but was denied asylum in the exercise of
discretion and was unable to meet the more stringent standard for relief under § 243(h).
See generally Anker & Blum, supra note 93. However, the BIA's decision in In re Pula,
19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1987), has seemingly calmed those concerns, moving away
from a hard-line approach announced previously in In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311
(BIA 1982).
143. In Cardoza-Fonseca,the Court stated:
The narrow legal question whether the two standards are the same is, of
course, quite different from the question of interpretation that arises in each
case in which the agency is required to apply either or both standards to a
particular set of facts. There is obviously some ambiguity in a term like "wellfounded fear" which can only be given concrete meaning through a process of
case-by-case adjudication. In that process of filling "any gap left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress," the courts must respect the interpretation of the
agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering
the statutory program. But our task today is much narrower, and is well within
the province of the Judiciary. We do not attempt to set forth a detailed
description of how the "well-founded fear" test should be applied.
480 U.S. at 448 (citation and footnote omitted).
144. See In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). In In re Mogharrabi, the BIA moved quickly to conform its practice to Cardoza-Fonseca.After surveying the various circuits, the BIA adopted the definition of the standard that the Fifth
Circuit had articulated in Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986),

commentators alike began to see a trend that signaled a narrowing
construction of the qualifying grounds, apparently as a counterbalance to the leniency of the evidentiary standard of proof.
Although the Cardoza-Fonsecadecision ended years of litigation
overthe appropriate evidentiary standard of proof in asylum cases,
resolution of this key issue has not led to the definitional precision
needed to determine the threshold criteria for asylum relief. 1 " Initially, many knowledgeable observers applauded Cardoza-Fonsecaas
a landmark case for asylum-seekers. However, more than a decade
has passed since the enactment of the Refugee Act, and still no definitive interpretations have been accorded its general statutory
terms and phrases, such as "persecution"' 46 and "on account of," or
what criteria they entail. 47
3.

The Second Generation of Asylum Cases

Case law development is now under way in what has been aptly
labelled "the second generation of asylum cases." 1 " This set of cases
addresses the substantive content of the threshold criteria for eligibility under section 208 of the 1INA.
Predictably, they have taken
49
over center stage in the debate.
This second generation of cases has arisen precisely because the
Refugee Act failed to define the key terms and phrases that govern
the substantive threshold criteria for asylum eligibility.50 Whether a
coherent set of principles can be established judicially to guide
agency determinations in the absence of clear statutory definition remains to be seen. Litigants and commentators alike have asserted
that the humanitarian purpose of the Refugee Act requires an expansive construction of governing provisions, consistent with the
ameliorative benefits of the Act. In contrast, administrative officials
and most courts have taken a narrow approach in interpreting the
as a general approach to deciding § 208 cases. This standard became known as the "reasonable person" standard.
145. See Smith & Hake, supra note 100, at 13 ("Years of litigation over the burden of proof in asylum and withholding cases have not led to definitional precision...
.1').

146. See, e.g., Sophie H. Pirie, The Need for a Codified Definition of "Persecution" in United States Refugee Law, 39 STAN. L. REV. 187 (proposing the codification of
the term "persecution" because government, in effect, cannot be trusted to do the correct
thing).
147. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Brill, Note, The Endless Debate: Refugee Law and
Policy and the 1980 Refugee Act, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 117 (1983-1984); Pamela S.
Barnett, Comment, United States PoliticalAsylum for Salvadoran Refugees: A Continuing Debate, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 131 (1985).
148. Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 6.
149. See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S.Ct. 812 (1992).
150. See e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 16; Anker & Blum, supra note 93.
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pertinent statutory grounds. 151
One court, construing the phrase "on account of ...political opin-

ion," found no specific definition as to its meaning and scope expressed in the Refugee Act.1 52 Reading the Act's legislative history,
the court concluded that Congress did not "unambiguously express
' 53
an intent that the term should be construed in a particular way."'
When legislators do not define a statutory phrase, the accepted
course of action for courts is to give "considerable weight" to the
agency's interpretation if reasonable and consistent with the legislative purpose. Furthermore, courts are admonished not to substitute
their own construction for that of the agency.154 In CardozaFonseca, the Supreme Court specifically observed that judicial deference is ordinarily given to a reasonable interpretation of statutory
terms propounded by the agency to which interpretation is
charged. 55 That would ordinarily be the case here, with the Refugee
Act, because Congress did not define the key statutory phrases at the
time of its enactment. But some courts, notably the Ninth Circuit,
asserting that Congress intended the Refugee Act to be remedial in
nature, have not
given the deference usually accorded an agency's
56
interpretation .1
Among the qualifying causes of persecution, the categories of
"race," "religion," and "nationality" are relatively straightforward
and therefore self-explanatory. But the remaining grounds, "membership in a particular social group" and "political opinion," are
problematic because they are vague as to meaning or at least susceptible to expansive interpretations and therefore not so easily defined.

151. Because of the underlying humanitarian goals of this legislation, an admittedly narrow construction of the key terms and phrases by the administration is seemingly at odds with these goals. However, as noted earlier, the Refugee Act focused
primarily on the overseas refugee program and not the in-state asylum adjudication system. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
152. Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292 (lth
Cir. 1990).
153. Id. at 1296.
154. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987)).
155. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 448. Although the Supreme Court specifically
rejected the government's heavy reliance on Chevron in Cardoza-Fonseca,it did set forth
specifically the relevant text from Chevron in its entirety. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at
445 n.29.
156. See, e.g., Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984) (Ninth
Circuit takes a vastly different approach to asylum claims than the Board of Immigration
Appeals).

For example, the First Circuit, in upholding the BIA's denial of asylum to a Salvadoran who refused to serve in his country's army, determined that eligibility for the relief requires specific proof that
persecution is on account of an individual's political opinion and not
for punishment he may suffer because of his refusal to serve. 157 The
Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has interpreted the qualifying
grounds quite expansively with its "imputed political opinion," or
"neutrality," line of analysis in cases involving military conscription
or forced recruitment in civil war situations. 1 8
A literal interpretation of the phrase "on account of ... political
opinion" would suggest that the asylum-seeker must possess some

opinion or belief of a nature inimical to the government or a group
that the government cannot or will not control. The category "membership in a particular social group" is more obscure but has received less attention in the courts. 5 9 Persecution on account of

political opinion is the ground that has stirred the most controversy
and court attention to date. 60
For the most part, case law development of these two particular
grounds has occurred in cases of asylum-seekers fleeing internal
strife and civil war in homelands close to the United States. 1 ' The
critical concern, at least for the agency, is how far these grounds will
be expanded before asylum relief is available to entire populations of
countries in the Western Hemisphere. In the 1980s, the circuit
courts addressed, for the most part, the claims of asylum-seekers
who present themselves as "coup plotters," "draft resisters" or
157. See Umanzor-Alvarado v. INS, 896 F.2d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Insofar as
this evidence shows that the Government [of El Salvador] may punish [the applicant]
simply because he will not serve in the Army, however, it does not show that the Government will persecute him because of his political opinion.").
158. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984). See, e.g.,
Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 6 n.4 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Apparently only the Ninth
Circuit has determined that mere refusal to join the guerrillas is itself a manifestation of
neutrality within the meaning of the [Refugee] Act.").
159. Maryellen Fullerton, PersecutionDue to Membership in a ParticularSocial
Group: Jurisprudence in the Federal Republic of Germany, 4 GEO. INIMIOR. L.J. 381,
382 (1990) (commenting that this particular concept is underutilized as a definitional
category for establishing refugee status). This may be the next fertile ground for dispute
as to intended meanings in light of the restrictions that the Supreme Court has placed on
the "political opinion" category in Elias-Zacarias,as discussed infra.
160. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 23-28 (contending that the focus
should be on the reason for the harm or threat of harm, not the fact of the harm itself).
According to Professor Aleinikoff, the emphasis on the five listed factors is unduly restrictive. Id. at 23-24.
161. Aliens from abroad are coming to the United States in increasing numbers
through John F. Kennedy Airport in New York City. See Donatella Lorch, A Flood of
Illegal Aliens Enters U.S. Via Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1992 (Metro); Ira H.
Mehlman, The New Jet Set: Think the Rio Grande is a PorousBorder? Try New York's
JFK, Where Anyone Can Enter Through the Magic of Political Asylum, NAT'L REV.,
Mar. 15, 1993, at 40.
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"draft evaders," "conscientious objectors," "neutrals," and individu16 2
als who seek to avoid "forced conscription" in a guerrilla army.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has expanded the "political opinion" category so as to mandate a presumption of eligibility in certain circumstances.16 3 These holdings are, in effect, designed to carve out per se
rules to qualify individuals who lack the requisite characteristics on
account of one of the five listed grounds or are unable to demonstrate specific or targeted persecution. Last year, one 6of
the Ninth
4
Circuit's rulings found its way to the Supreme Court.
INS v. Elias-Zacarias,115another expansive interpretation of the
qualifying grounds offered by the Ninth Circuit involving a "forcible
recruitment" case, was the first of the second-generation asylum
cases presented to the Supreme Court. At the circuit court level, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA's denial of asylum to a Guatemalan
who had refused to join a guerrilla group. The Ninth Circuit ruled
that this refusal was an expression of political opinion and thus satisfied the statutory requirement for refugee status, establishing the
Guatemalan's eligibility for asylum relief. 66 The Supreme Court, in
turn, reversed, upholding the Board's determination "in all respects;"
thus concluding, in effect, that "a guerrilla organization's attempt to
coerce a person into performing military service does not necessarily
constitute persecution on account of political
opinion for asylum pur6
poses under § 101(a)(42)" of the INA. 1
In rejecting the Ninth Circuit's use of a presumption based on the
political motives of the persecutor to establish eligibility under the
Act, the Court held that the asylum applicant must establish that his
fear of persecution is on account of his political opinion and not the
persecutor's. Furthermore, the Court determined that the asylum applicant failed to demonstrate that the threat of forced recruitment
162. See generally ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 790-813.
163. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985).
164. Another Ninth Circuit case, INS v. Canas-Segovia, 112 S. Ct. 1152 (1992),
which the Supreme Court, having previously granted certiorari, vacating the judgment in
that case, remanded to the Ninth Circuit in light of its decision in INS v. EliasZacarias.The Ninth Circuit recently issued its decision upholding the validity of a claim
of asylum based on imputed political opinion, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's opinion. As such, another one of the Ninth Circuit's theories of asylum eligibility may once
again find its way to the Supreme Court.
165. 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), digested in 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 166 (1992).
166. Elias-Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 850-52 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd 112 S. Ct.
812 (1992). For a detailed discussion of the Ninth Circuit's decision, see U.S. Seeks
Supreme Court Review of Another 9th Circuit Asylum Decision, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 320 (1991).
167. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 814, 817 (1992).

was on account of that political opinion. The Court did not find that
the statute required direct proof of the persecutor's motive, but
found that it intended some evidence of motive or intent to be
presented.-1 8 Noting this, some commentators have concluded that
the case is necessarily limited by its lack of evidence.16 9
The Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias7 0 potentially undercuts the Ninth Circuit's use of per se rules in the other
circumstances in which it has established its particular line of asylum analysis.1 7 ' The Court did not rule on the respondent's alternative grounds of eligibility, which included "neutrality" and "imputed
political opinion," thus leaving open these questions for further adjudication in the lower courts. 7 2 Nonetheless, the Court's reasoning
seriously threatens the Ninth Circuit's "imputed political opinion"
and "neutrality" line of analysis because the Court focused on the
asylum-seeker's expressive conduct and not the political motivations
of the persecutor, while at the same time applying the plain meaning
73
rule.

1

168. Id. at 816-17.
169. The Court's opinion in this case is limited to its facts. In its petition for certiorari, the government articulated the issue presented as follows:
The Refugee Act of 1980 requires an alien seeking asylum to demonstrate
"a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C.
1 101(a)(42), 1158(a). The question presented is whether a guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce a person into performing military service necessarily
constitutes persecution "on account of" that person's political opinion.
Brief for the INS at 1, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (No. 90-1342).
The Court then held that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had no proper
basis to set aside the BIA's denial of asylum to a Guatemalan youth who had fled his
country after armed and masked guerrillas came to his home in an attempt to recruit
him to join their forces. In so ruling, the Court focused on the asylum applicant's failure
to present sufficient evidence of his reasons for refusal to join the guerrillas' cause. The
Court further held that an applicant must provide some direct or circumstantial evidence
of the persecutor's motive, finding that in the instant case the record was insufficient to
establish the requisite evidence.
170. 112 S. Ct 812 (1992).
171. The Ninth Circuit had held that the respondent's refusal to join a guerrilla
army was a form of expressive conduct that met the "on account of... political opinion"
requirement. Elias-Zacarias,921 F.2d at 850-52. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in this
case centers on the notion that the persecutor's motive in carrying out its threats in this
context was "political." Id. at 850.
172. According to immigration lawyers interviewed about the impact of the
Court's latest asylum decision, the ruling raises a whole new issue of proof requiring
asylum seekers to articulate their political opinions more thoroughly. Susan Freinkel,
As)jlum Ruling Could Make Appeals Harderfor Aliens, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), Jan. 23, 1992, at 1.
173. In general, asylum cases involve claims of likely persecution at the hands of
the government. However, it is well established case law that "persecution within the
meaning of § 243(h) [and § 208(a)] includes persecution by non-governmental groups
.. . where it is shown that the government of the proposed country of deportation is
unwilling or unable to control that group." McMullen v. INS, 658 F.d 1312, 1315 n.2
(9th Cir. 1981).
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The plain meaning rule amounts to a literal interpretation of the

statutory words and phrases. Only what is plainly understood or
written will be considered in the process of judicial construction.

Such novel theories as "imputed political opinion" and "neutrality"
are unlikely to pass muster under the plain meaning rule because the
contemplate their meaning. 7 4

statutory language does not clearly

Thus, if Congress intended these expansive interpretations to be ap-

plicable in asylum cases, then it remains for Congress to expressly
state so by amending the pertinent statutory provisions. Other-

wise-at least at the Supreme Court level for now-the plain meaning

is likely

to restrict

statutory

construction

to a

literal

understanding of the phrase "political opinion." On the other hand,
the plain meaning rule applied to the phrase "membership in a particular social group" is not likely to be so easily disposed of on re-

view. In that regard, the Court is likely to give deference to the
agency's interpretation of that phrase, as mandated by the rule of

Chevron.7 5

Nonetheless, critics have charged that the Elias-Zacariasdecision

is contrary to congressional intent. Indeed, the dissenting opinion
characterized the majority's decision as a "narrow, grudging construction of the concept of political opinion" that is inconsistent with
the Court's prior interpretations of the Refugee Act and cited to

Cardoza-Fonseca.However, the dissent's reliance on this case is mis-

placed.116 Indeed, the Court's decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
174. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984) (applying a literal construction to the pertinent words of the statutory provision § 244(a), rendering the contrary to the INS's own liberal or expansive interpretation of the pertinent language).
This decision "required the disapproval of twenty years of virtually unbroken case law,
that reached a result at odds with the BIA interpretation, and that produced law far
more extreme than what even the INS had sought." STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 524 (1992). It is noteworthy that two years later, when Congress
passed IRCA, it created a new INA § 244(b)(2) that, in effect, permitted a flexible
interpretation of the language which had governed administrative practice in this area
for many, many years. Id.
175. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984).
176. But see Deborah E. Anker et al., The Supreme Court's Decision in INS v.

Elias-Zacarias: Is There Any "There" There?, 69

INTERPRETER RELEASES

285, 289

(1992) (criticizing the Court's failure to clarify "the relationship between its ruling and
the statute's "well-founded fear" standard). Id. at 289. The authors also state, "In spirit
and in its implicit vision of the role of the Court, the decision in Elias-Zacariasdiffers
significantly from the Supreme Court's opinion five years earlier in INS v. CardozaFonseca." Id. at 288 (citation omitted). The article thus concludes that the Court's most
recent asylum decision "leaves us uncertain about the future direction of judicial interpretation of the refugee definition." Id. at 289.

established law favorable to asylum-seekers with the adoption of a
more generous evidentiary standard for deciding asylum claims.
However, Cardoza-Fonsecais part of the first generation of asylum
cases that focused on the procedural aspects of the adjudicatory process. Moreover, this lenient approach to adjudicating asylum claims
was tempered by the clear statement that the agency's discretionary
177
determinations would be given greater deference by the Court.
Narrowly construing the key terms and phrases consistent with a literal interpretation could, arguably, be considered an exercise of this
discretion.
In any event, the Court's decision in Elias-Zacariasstill leaves
potentially major issues in the asylum debate unresolved. 1 8 Also, the
Court's narrow interpretation of the phrase "political opinion" could
affect thousands of similarly situated asylum applicants.17 Moreover, this decision could potentially affect other interpretations
deemed "expansive" and, in particular, the Ninth Circuit's "imputed
political opinion" and "neutrality" grounds. If historical precedent is
any guide, another asylum issue (or issues) will arise soon. Most
likely there will be an effort to expand another category of the refugee definition.'1 0 For example, as a panel of the Ninth Circuit observed in a case involving an asylum claim based on "social
group,"' "that... category is a flexible one which extends broadly
to encompass many groups who do not otherwise fall within the
18 2
other categories of race, nationality, religion, or political opinion.'
With this potential for repeated and inconclusive judicial definition,
it seems appropriate for Congress to fill in the blanks, or at least
establish some outer limits for these terms through the legislative
process. The case law development in asylum litigation thus far underscores the shortcomings of an adjudicatory approach for deciding
the concrete meaning of terms that are so closely entwined with political overtones and immigration ramifications.
177.
178.

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
Anker et al., supra note 176.

179. 69

INTERPRETER RELEASES

117-18 (1992).

180. For example, if the Court does restrict the expansiveness of the "political
opinion" category, the "membership in a social group" category remains an avenue for
further expansion. That category "may be the most vague or elusive of the five factors
listed in the statute." ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 813. Accord Fullerton,
supra note 159, at 382-83 (noting that this category is the most underutilized in the
U.N. Convention definition).
181. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d. 1571 (9th Cir. 1986). In this case, the
applicants argued that they feared persecution in El Salvador as members of the following group: "young, urban, working class males of military age who had never served in
the military or otherwise expressed support for the government." Id. at 1573. Of note,
"[t]his was a common theme in many Salvadoran cases in the 1980s." ALEINIKOFF &
MARTIN, supra note 24, at 813.
182. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1986). The court further
noted that the statutory words "particular" and "social" modify "group." Id.
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
A.

The Nature of the Problem
1. In General

Asylum relief presents an opportunity to emergency immigrants
who would not otherwise qualify under the regular system of immigration. Consequently, one problem inherent in the current statutory
scheme is its inability to control numbers. Presently, large backlogs
of asylum applications are pending. Understandably, courts and administrative officials are reluctant to expand qualifying grounds for
asylum relief without specific direction from Congress. The numerical controls built into the overseas refugee program are entirely absent from the current in-state statutory scheme of asylum
adjudication. Nor are these controls likely to be effective without
greater enforcement efforts at United States borders. Nonetheless,
some form of control over numbers is necessary to assure continued
public support for asylum in the United States."83 An overview of the
problem in the context of other pertinent factors may be helpful.
2. Numbers and Control
There is a growing population of undocumented aliens, 8 and until recently, opportunities for lawful immigration were extremely
limited. Thus, it is doubtful that Congress intended to create a
mechanism for the large-scale processing of asylum applications inside the United States. Prior to 1990, intending immigrants gained
183. Moreover, as Professor Martin observes,
[The 1951 Convention does not guarantee asylum, in the sense of a durable
lawful residence status, but] since 1951 most Western countries, to their credit,
have set up asylum claims systems that essentially combine the determination
of refugee status under the 1951 Convention definition with the discretionary
act of providing durable status, or asylum ....

In this sense, we have come

close to a system that guarantees an individual right of asylum to those who
somehow establish physical presence on the soil of such Western countries and
also prove that they satisfy the Convention definition.
That these admirable features of the system go beyond the strict requirements of international law, however, should remind us of their fragility. They
cannot be taken as inevitable constants. Instead, it must be an ever-present
concern of wise policy to shape asylum measures, including adjudication systems, so as to maximize continued domestic support. The systems' inability to
cope effectively with growing numbers of asylum seekers over the last decade
now threatens that foundation.
Martin, Reforming Asylum, supra note 14, at 1256-57.
184. For example, in 1987 estimates of the number of aliens from Central America
in the United States were as high as one million. Martin, supra note 50, at 163.

lawful admission to the United States under a selection system based
on family relations or employment preferences in conjunction with
current visa availability. 185 The immigration preference provisions
are subject to numerical limitations and previously allowed for the
immigration of only 270,000 individuals annually, exclusive of those
who qualified as "immediate relatives." However, that allocation of
categories and numbers soon became overwhelmed by increasing
backlogs in several of the designated categories. At the same time,
increasing numbers of undocumented aliens placed additional demands on the Agency.
3. Regular Immigration Legislative Initiatives
In the early eighties, Congress debated the issue of illegal immigration and finally settled upon legislation designed to remedy the
problem of undocumented workers. 8 " In 1986, when the undocumented alien population was estimated to be between three and
twelve million, Congress adopted a two-step approach to remedy the
situation. In the first phase, an amnesty program was established for
those undocumented aliens in the United States arriving before January 1, 1982. In the second phase, the imposition of employer sanctions was designed to stem one of the "pull" factors of illegal
immigration. Most asylum-seekers did not benefit from this legalization program, however, because their arrival did not occur in significant numbers until after the established cut-off date. Thus, employer
sanctions made jobs potentially difficult to obtain.'87 On the other
hand, asylum-seekers presenting non-frivolous claims of asylum were
granted this authorization pending the adjudication of their
applications.
The Immigration Act of 1990, a new legislative reform measure
aimed at lawful immigration, increased the availability of immigrant
visas to an enlarged group of eligible individuals. The employment
categories for lawful immigration were expanded further, and other
particularized categories of entrants, such as applicants from countries disadvantaged by the 1965 amendments which eliminated the
Eurocentric national quotas, benefitted from the new law. Notwithstanding the increased visa availability for these specified categories,
however, opportunities for asylum-seekers who do not eventually
qualify for asylum are still limited under the 1990 Act.
First, asylum-seekers, as a rule, do not come from countries that
185. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 131-36 (1992).
186. IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of title 8 of the United States Code).
187. See Martin, supra note 50 (reflecting on a probable linkage between the employer sanctions of the new IRCA measure and future asylum problems).
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benefitted under the 1990 Act. Second, they are more likely to fall
into the skilled or unskilled category in which the numbers of available visas are still rather low.1 88 In addition, concern about this country's ability to compete with the European Community and Japan
may reorient United States priorities as to who receives immigration
preferences for admission into the United States. The 1990 Act, with
its clear emphasis on increasing the numbers of highly skilled and
professional immigrants, bears this out. Therefore, the individuals
most likely to seek asylum will probably not qualify for regular immigration unless they can do so through a close family relationship.
(The policy of family reunification still drives the regular immigration preference system.)
Congress long ago abandoned an open-door policy of immigration.
Because the current statutory framework permits asylum seekers to
apply while physically present in the United States without regard to
their immigration status, some constraints on the processing of asylum applications will be necessary. This is particularly so since there
presently exists no mechanisms in place to control the numbers of
asylum seekers entering the United States. Therefore, a practical
matter, the legislative process is best suited for this type of debate,
notwithstanding its shortcomings. But as long as only broad and general criteria are in place for deciding asylum claims, the courts will
determine these policy matters, and "control" of the numbers of entering emergency immigrants will be left to the courts' decision.
B.

The Current State of Asylum Adjudication and Refugee
Protection
1. The Impact of the New Asylum Regulations

In 1990 the INS issued the long-awaited final asylum regulations,
having operated under interim rules for nearly a decade.1 89 Unfortunately, the characterization of the old regulatory system of asylum
adjudications as a "lengthy, redundant, and costly [procedure that]
188. See INA § 203(b)(3)(A)(i) (skilled workers), (iii) (other workers),
203(b)(3)(B) (limiting the number of visas available to unskilled workers to only 10,000
per year).
189. 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674 (1990) (replacing 8 C.F.R. pt. 208 and amending a few
other sections of the regulations). Before being adopted in final form in 1990, these regulations were proposed originally in 1987 and then reissued in modified form in early
1988. Of particular note, the new regulations take the adjudicatory function from the
examiners in the INS district offices and place it instead with a specialized "corps of
professional Asylum Officers who are to receive special training in international relations
and international law." 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(b) (1990). However, the application must still

could still stimulate the filing of less-than-certain claims" 190 may
still have currency. Even though the new regulations make significant improvements in the adjudication process, they are essentially
procedural and therefore unlikely to resolve the current problem in
asylum, which arises from the substantive criteria of the current legal definition. Still, several aspects of the new features make the process fairer and more efficient.
The new asylum regulations have addressed the main criticism of
asylum adjudications in that they replaced the State Department advisory opinions which were rendered impotent even before the new
regulations. Additionally, they provide for a corps of specialized asylum adjudicators who could work more efficiently if given a more
precise set of qualifying grounds. Thus, with prescribed guidelines,
concerns about agency bias should be largely eliminated.
The most innovative aspect of the new regulations is the provision
191
for new asylum officers to adjudicate applications affirmatively.
This is the centerpiece of the new asylum regulations and, together
with the corresponding establishment of the new specialization
center for document control to aid decision-making, it reduces the
politicizing of the process. 192 These two aspects of the new regulations have received favorable comment. 93 At the very least, knowledgeable observers are prepared to take a "wait-and-see" posture
concerning the new regulations. However, the new process provides
no definitional clarity.
be filed in the INS district office. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a) (1990). Nonetheless, the adjudicatory function has been separated from the enforcement function of INS. The new asylum
adjudicatory scheme places asylum officers in seven offices throughout the country in
cities with high concentrations of asylum applicants. For an analytical overview of the
new asylum regulations, see Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. et al., The New Asylum Rules, 9
IMMIOR. L. REP. 85 (1990).
190. Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 193: "[T]here is no evidence that most, or even a
significant number, of aliens are 'abusing' the system. Of course, resolution of the 'abuse'
debate will not dissolve concern with the current asylum adjudication process."
191. Id. "Most importantly, the 1990 regulations formally recognize the uniqueness and difficulty of asylum adjudication by assigning this function to a new corps of
specialists who will do asylum adjudications full time." ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra
note 24, at 831.
192. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.1 (1990). The regulations establish a documentation
center separate from the information depositories of the Department of State. In addition, they specifically authorize reliance on "other credible sources, such as international
organizations, private voluntary agencies, or academic institutions." Id. § 208.12. The
State Department still plays a role in the asylum process, albeit limited. 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.4(a), 208.11, 236.3(b), 242.17(c)(3) (1990). In essence, the regulations have preserved an opportunity for the State Department to comment on any asylum claim, but
the adjudicating official need not await receipt of an "advisory" letter before adjudicating the claim. Id. § 208.11. Note that the State Department's role had begun to diminish in 1988 when it decided to no longer provide an individual letter routinely in each
asylum case. See 53 Fed. Reg. 2893 (1988).
193. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 737 n.24. See also 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.12(a) (1990).
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The effectiveness of the new regulations ultimately depends on
whether individuals seeking asylum are members of easily identifiable groups, such as those of particular race, religion, and nationality, that are being persecuted. The phrase "on account of . .
political opinion" raises concerns because it is not a group-based category. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Elias-Zacarias
may portend a narrowing of the category based on "political opinion," some observers view the Court's decision as underscoring only
the need for greater evidentiary proof. Certainly, the question of how
expansively this particular category can be read is still an open question.194 Consequently, as long as definitive content is missing from
these terms, new and novel grounds will continue to be advanced.
2. The Effect of the New "Safe-Haven" Legislation
Promulgation of the new regulations was not the only event to affect the asylum adjudication process in 1990. As part of the new
Immigration Act of 1990, Congress passed a safe-haven measure according temporary refuge to eligible foreign nationals already in this
country. This new measure provides for the granting of "temporary
protected status" to eligible individuals whose homelands are experiencing civil war or political upheaval. The underlying intent of this
measure is that foreign nationals may stay in this country temporarily until conditions in their homeland justify termination of their
status.195 "Safe-haven" rights are recognized under international

law, but safe-haven legislation must be enacted by each nation-state
to trigger relief within that state. 196 Thus, this safe-haven-type relief
194. As Professor Aleinikoff has observed, the Act itself supports the view that
Congress did not anticipate the substantial numbers of asylum applications, which have
increased exponentially over the years. Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 184 n.1 1. The original Refugee Act provided that no more than 5,000 asylees could be granted permanent
resident status each year. INA § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1988). This figure is comparable to the number of applications filed in the two years preceding the passage of the
Refugee Act. Aleinikoff, supra note 13. Also, "[i]n 1978, 3,702 aliens filed asylum applications with the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. In 1979, 5,801 applications were filed. As a result of the Immigration Act of 1990, the number of potential
grants of permanent resident status to aliens accorded asylee status was increased to
10,000. INA § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(1991). This is still a far cry from the
100,000 plus who have filed for asylum.
195. See Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of
a Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 554-58 (1986); see also Michael G. Heyman, Redefining Refugee: A Proposalfor Relieffor the Victims of Civil Strife, 24 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 449 (1987).
196. See generally Note, Temporary Safe Haven for De Facto Refugees from
War, Violence, and Disasters, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 509 (1988) (discussing the DeConcini-

provides protection to individuals in a broader range of
circum1 7
stances than is mandated under international agreements. 1
Although the measure specifically accords Salvadorans temporary
protected status (TPS), a considerable lobbying effort on their behalf
consumed the better part of the decade before relief was finally
forthcoming.19 8 Yet the government may, in its discretion, accord
TPS to other foreign nationals who meet the general criteria established by the Act's provisions. 19 Thus, when Congress enacted safehaven legislation, it in effect accomplished what the refugee lobbyists
had attempted to do for a long time and what some courts had presumably attempted to do with their expansive definitions of "refugee." Although broader in scope than asylum, this new measure is
not intended as a substitute for more permanent relief.200 Those eligible for asylum still must apply and receive asylum in order to remain more permanently in the United States.
Undoubtedly, TPS was not intended to accord relief to groups of
people who are not already physically present in the United
States.20 ' Indeed, the current crisis involving the Haitian refugees is
an example of the complexities associated with this measure. The
passage of "safe-haven" legislation to accommodate a broader class

Moakley Bill, which proposed a statutory framework for what would remain discretionary executive-branch decisions to grant temporary refuge, i.e., "safe haven").
197. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 841: "Persons who flee anarchy,
war or civil strife present strong humanitarian claims, at least to receive temporary permission to remain within the confines of the U.S."
198. Note that much of the debate over safe haven focused on the situation that
confronted the nationals of El Salvador in the 1980s. The question remains for the administration to decide what to do with the approximately 200,000 Salvadorans granted
temporary protected status (TPS) under the Immigration Act of 1990 § 303. However,
their authorized TPS expired last year in June and was not extended. Then President
Bush authorized the Attorney General to grant Salvadorans deferred enforced departure
(DED) for one year beyond June 30, 1992, which is, as a practical matter, the same as
having TPS. 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 600 (1992). As such, come June 1993, the new
Attorney General will have to decide whether to act upon the previously issued orders to
show cause. 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 314 (1992). Currently, the departure of those in
DED status has been deferred until June 30, 1993. 57 Fed. Reg. 28,700, reportedin 69
INTERPRETER RELEASES 797 (1992). According to informed sources, however, the U.S.
government has tentatively decided to extend DED status to Salvadoran nationals in the
United States for another 18 months beyond the current June departure date. 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 557 (1993).
199. INA § 244A (added by § 302 of the Immigration Act of 1990).
200. See Government's Petition for Certiorari at 20-21, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, No.
90-1342 (filed Feb. 1991).
201. The recent settlement of the claims of an estimated 150,000 undocumented
Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum-seekers in American Baptist Churches v.
Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991), is unlikely to be instructive in the
asylum debate because, although a landmark settlement, it only allows asylum-seekers
who have been denied relief to have their claims reconsidered. This case was originally
filed as a class action challenging INS treatment of asylum claims by these nationals.
For a detailed discussion of the case, see 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1480 (1990).
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of foreign nationals than is provided by the classical grounds for asylum is further support for the notion that asylum relief should not be
so broadly defined. Congress has left to the agency's discretion the

designation of future groups of foreign nationals that will qualify
and has allowed for a number of factors to play a role in the
designation.
But this approach to refugee emergencies is not without dangers.
Although safe haven status is only a temporary solution, it may become part of a more permanent problem. 202 The grant of this status
could "create a population that is in limbo for long periods and, in
effect, is in a second-class situation. 2 0 3 An earlier observation about
a similar administrative form of relief, "extended voluntary departure," drew attention to a serious problem associated with long periods of temporary relief. Specifically, long-term relief can make it
impossible to return foreign nationals to their impoverished homelands once conditions stabilize there. After many years of residing in
the United States, difficult social and cultural reintegration in their
homelands could make their return problematic.2 04 Another concern

is that a preliminary declaration of safe-haven status-that is, not as
a result of a long-term lobbying effort-will precipitate a large-scale
influx. There are no easy answers or solutions. For now, even though
temporary protected status has expired for Salvadorans, there is no
movement afoot to commence deportation proceedings against them
because they have been placed in "deferred enforced departure" sta-

tus until June 30, 1993. 205 Thus, the climate seems appropriate to
202. As noted by the researchers in the 1987 Refugee Policy Group report:
The absence of a safe haven status can also have negative repercussions on
asylum, however. Some asylum applicants know that they do not have strong
asylum claims, but there are few other ways to contest deportation to such
countries as El Salvador. In such cases, the asylum application is itself a form
of safe haven since individuals will not be deported until they exhaust all appeals. As a result, the asylum system is overloaded with cases that are not
likely to succeed on their merits. Immigration officials, seeing the large number
of non-meritorious claims, then tend to view the asylum system as fraught with
abuses. Recognizing that some applicants have good grounds for wishing to
remain in the United States, given the conditions in their home countries, some
immigration officials spoke to the need for a second status that they could use
to provide temporary relief.
GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 8, at 76.
203. Id. at 75.
204. GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 8,at 29. The authors describe a situation
involving the provision of extended voluntary departure relief to Ugandans who have
remained so long in this country that they have become assimilated to the American way
of life. Voluntary repatriation is an unlikely prospect for them.
205. 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 797 (1992).

focus on a more permanent resolution of the problem.
C. A Climate for Change

1. In General
The changing political landscape and changing global
demographics would seem to dictate congressional action in deciding
the future direction of asylum adjudications. Moreover, the climate
for fundamental legislative reform of the asylum process seems hospitable for several reasons. First, with the end of the cold war and
the fall of communism, any remaining inclination to decide asylum
on ideological grounds is likely to wane considerably in the nineties.
Second, the 1990 asylum regulations have found apparent acceptance among knowledgeable people who seem willing to take a "waitand-see" posture.206 Third, the safe-haven legislation of the 1990
Act 0 7 finally accomplished in large part what supporters of the
American sanctuary movement had attempted to achieve for the better part of the eighties: temporary refuge for Salvadoran nationals
from a war-torn country. 8
2. Long-Term Solutions Needed
The passage of TPS is a temporary relief measure, 209 not a longterm resolution of the problem.210 Its coverage is broad in scope and
not intended to provide permanent resettlement of asylum-seekers in
206. See, e.g., Helton, supra note 105, at 789.
207. See generally Nancy J. Mims, Note, GrantingSafe Haven to El Salvadoran
Refugees: Moakley-Deconcini Bill Offers HumanitarianApproach to Difficult Problems
in the United States and Central America, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 603 (1989)
(describing the history of the legislative proposal designed to address the plight of the
then estimated 500,000 Salvadorans living in the United States).
208. See Robert Rubin, Ten Years After: Vindication for Salvadorans and New
Promisesfor Safe Haven and Refugee Protection, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 97 (1991).
209. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. This measure authorizes the Attorney
General to extend TPS to aliens who are nationals of a country that the Attorney General finds to be in a state of "ongoing armed conflict" so that deportation to that country
would pose a "serious threat" to the personal safety of the affected aliens. Section
302(b)(1)(A), 104 Stat. 5031 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)).
210. Note that § 302 of the Immigration Act of 1990 added a new section, 244A,
authorizing the Attorney General to grant TPS to nationals of certain designated countries. Section 302(b)(1)(A), 104 Stat. 5031 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)). Section
303 of the 1990 Act, on the other hand, specifically designated El Salvador as a country
whose nationals are eligible for TPS. Section 303, 104 Stat. 5031. Several hundred thousand undocumented Salvadorans qualified for this new status. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990,
at 30. Those who qualified received 18 months of "safe haven" in the United States,
along with interim work authorization. Because their TPS status was not extended, their
status reverted to undocumented in June 1992 at which time they became subject to
deportation. However, as noted above, they were placed in DED status and no action to
deport them will be taken before June 30, 1993. See 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 600, 707
(1992).
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this country."' Although the recent peace accords ending the war in

El Salvador have brought about a relative tranquility, this pause in
the asylum debate may be short-lived.2 12 Nonetheless, these recent

events do afford the legislative policy-makers some time for reasoned
reflection on the remaining asylum issues. Congress last considered

asylum in a decidedly different world order and in a context of numerically insignificant grants of asylum per year.2 13 As long as gaps

exist in interpreting the governing provisions, courts inclined to read
the pertinent provisions expansively to permit grants of asylum to

large groups of individuals, or narrowly with the potential of denying
bona fide refugee claims, 21 4 will continue to do so. 215 By undertaking

a legislative initiative to provide greater specificity in the governing

211. The TPS authorized by the Immigration Act of 1990 bears on the interpretation of the Refugee Act in one respect only. By authorizing the temporary withholding of
deportation that "would pose a serious threat to [the alien's] personal safety"
(§ 302(b)(1)(A), 104 Stat. 5031, to be codified at 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)), the 1990 Act
seeks an objective far broader than that of the Refugee Act: to provide a sanctuary-albeit a temporary one-from the dangers of living in a country divided by civil
war. Presumably, when the fighting abates, Salvadoran nationals will be able to return to
their homeland without fear of retribution or reprisal.
212. The Bush administration extended the commencement of the forced departure
of Salvadoran Nationals accorded TPS (which expired June 1992) for one year only. See
69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 770 (1992).
213. With increasing global hostilities and a worldwide economic downtrend, all
modern, industrialized states are likely to be compelled to revisit the issues of refugee
protection. For example, in 1990 over 100,000 asylum applications were filed. Aleinikoff,
supra note 16, at 8-9.
214. Cases like those in the Ninth Circuit in which a large number of aliens may
be eligible for asylum further suggest that Congress ought to revisit this area:
By expanding that phrase to encompass forced conscription by political factions, the Ninth Circuit has opened eligibility for asylum to every candidate for
military service in countries torn by domestic strife. Needless to say, the class
of such persons is large. The looming burden for the INS in processing applications from such individuals, and for the Nation in assimilating them into society, necessitates this Court's review.
INS Pet. for Cert. at 9, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (No. 90-1342)
(filed Feb. 1991) (footnote omitted).
215. For example, in the words of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Perlera-Escobar v. E.O.I.R., 894 F.2d 1292 (1990) (per curiam), the Ninth Circuit is
issuing decisions that would "entitle almost anyone in a war torn country to meet the
statutory requirements for a grant of asylum." Id. at 1299 n.5. As noted in INS Pet. for
Cert. at 20, Elias-Zacarias(No. 90-1342):
Given the number of draft-age males in countries like Guatemala, and the "incentives for draft-age males to raise asylum claims," M.A. A26851062 v. INS,
899 F.2d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc), it is not unreasonable to expect a
flood of such claims from those placed in deportation proceedings in the Ninth
Circuit.
Id. (footnote omitted).

provisions, Congress can signal more clearly to the courts its legislative intent, while assisting the agency in guiding its decision-making.
Through the amendment process, Congress can modify the current
statutory scheme by setting forth clear-cut standards and guidelines,
informed by the "immensely rich" debate of the issues that has
taken place over the past decade.216
3. Legislative Intent and Policy Considerations
The prevailing view is that the Refugee Act evinces congressional
intent to promote the humanitarian goals of asylum and refugee protection.21 7 While this is true, these goals cannot be implemented to
the exclusion of other equally compelling considerations. In any
event, humanitarian concerns have always played a pivotal role in
immigration matters, and the concern for humanitarianism in asylum adjudication parallels an earlier debate over "extreme hardship"
cases.2 18 Unfortunately, an approach to refugee protection that encourages large numbers of asylum-seekers would seriously impact
current immigration policy and enforcement, complicating an already complex scenario for granting relief under a comparatively restrictive definition. Therefore, the argument for a broader definition
consistent with the American tradition of welcome is, in effect, a call
for a policy directive designed to include emergency immigrants or
"refugees" who may not fit so neatly or qualify for classical refugee
status.2 "'
Furthermore, there is a perception that asylum relief is easier to
get in the United States because the Refugee Act has, in effect, "liberalized the grounds for seeking political asylum. '221 Whatever the
reasons, this country is now a country of first asylum, attracting a
large number of Central Americans, and to a lesser degree Haitians,
like a magnet. 221 The largest concentrations of refugees today consist
primarily of foreign nationals fleeing civil war, ethnic strife, or other
disastrous conditions in their homelands. According to administration officials, these flights do not necessarily result from the kind of
216.

ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 696.
217. See Helton, supra note 60, at 250.
218. See, e.g., ALEINIKOFi & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 516-17 (discussing the
handling of "extreme hardships" cases in the era following the Supreme Court's decision
in INS v. Jong Ha Wang).
219. Also, these advocates argue for lenient evidentiary standards, citing the extreme consequences of an incorrect denial of asylum. See, e.g., Pirie, supra note 146, at
230.
220. John A. Scanlan, Asylum Adjudication: Some Due Process Implications of
ProposedImmigration Legislation, 44 U. PiTT. L. REv. 261 (1983); see also Pirie, supra
note 146, at 226 n.187.
221. See, e.g., Scanlan & Kent, supra note 3, at 65 (describing today's realities in
a world characterized by great disparities that make "the Western democracies, which
are comparatively wealthy, healthy, and free[,] natural magnets").
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targeted persecution in their homelands that would qualify them for
refugee status. Administration critics, however, charge that few asylum grants are given to bona fide applicants from countries in Central America and the Carribean (notably Haiti) for foreign policy
reasons. A measure that provides temporary refuge to foreign nationals on a group-designated basis, such as the current "safe haven"
provision, is likely to be a more appropriate means of addressing future refugee emergencies than one in which countless numbers of a
particular group apply individually for that relief. If the United
States is to be prepared to meet the refugee challenge in the future
and settle upon appropriate policy choices for the more permanent
form of asylum relief, it must reconsider its immigration priorities
and commitments to human rights and refugee protection through
the political process.
IV. A LEGISLATIVE REFORM PROPOSAL
A.

The Classic Definition Revisited
1. In General

The classic definition of "refugee"-conceived to respond to distinctly different political pressures-no longer captures the characteristics of the vast majority of asylum-seekers entering the United
States today. This deficiency is what has driven the current asylum
debate over whether the definitional standards should be interpreted
narrowly or expansively.22 2 Consequently, the dialogue in which several circuit courts-most notably the Ninth Circuit-have engaged
to define the parameters of that definition echoes the problems inher2 23
ent in a definition that no longer serves its historic purpose.
2.

The Problem of Modern-Day Application

As noted earlier, to qualify for "refugee" status, an asylum-seeker
must demonstrate that he or she is a person unwilling to return to
his or her homeland because of "persecution or a well-founded fear
222.

See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 5 (suggesting that the narrow interpre-

tations of agency determinations in asylum cases appear "to stem from concern about the
rising number of asylum applications, as well as from the fact that many cases turn on
assertions by the applicant that cannot be easily verified").
223. Compare Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984) and
Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985) with Perlera-Escobar v. EOIR,
894 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1990) and Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518 (4th Cir. 1986).

of persecution. 224 The persecution an applicant experiences in his or
her homeland is further limited to five enumerated categories: 22
race,226 religion, 227 nationality, 228 membership in a particular social
group,229 political opinion, a0 or any combination thereof. Interestingly, the first three categories are akin to the classic discrete and

insular minority groups-racial, religious, and national-that Justice
224. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). A "well-founded fear" is a
fear that is both genuine and objectively reasonable. Elias-Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d
844, 848 (9th Cir. 1990). To be objectively reasonable, there must be some reasonable
possibility of persecution, but persecution does not have to be more likely than not. INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 450 (1987).
225. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has issued
a handbook that sets forth the criteria for determining refugee status under the United
Nations Convention definition. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE
STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS
OF REFUGEES I (Geneva, 1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. It states, in pertinent part, as

follows:
(a) General analysis
66. In order to be considered a refugee, a person must show well-founded fear
of persecution for one of the reasons stated above. It is immaterial whether the
persecution arises from any single one of these reasons or from a combination
of two or more of them.
Id. at 17. Although the Handbook has played an important role in United States asylum
practice and is considered an authoritative guide to relevant standards under the United
Nations treatises and hence United States law (see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 438-39 (1987)), it "has been conceived as a practical guide and not as a treatise on
refugee law." HANDBOOK, supra, at 2.
226. The Handbook describes "race," in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) Race
68. Race, in the present connexion, has to be understood in its widest sense to
include all kinds of ethnic groups that are referred to as "races" in common
usage ....
HANDBOOK, supra note 225, at 18.
227. The Handbook describes "religion," in pertinent part, as follows:
(c) Religion

71. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Human Rights Covenant proclaim the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion ....

72. Persecution for "reasons of religion" may assume various forms, e.g., prohibition of membership of a religious community, of worship in private or in
public, of religious instruction, or serious measures of discrimination imposed
on persons becuse they practise their religion or belong to a particular religious community.
Id.
228. The Handbook describes "nationality," in pertinent part, as follows:
(d) Nationality
74. The term "nationality" in this context is not to be understood only as "citi-

zenship." It refers also to membership of an ethnic or linguistic group and may
occasionally overlap with the term "race." Persecution for reasons of nationality may consist of adverse attitudes and measures directed against a national
(ethnic, linguistic) minority and in certain circumstances the fact of belonging
to such a minority may in itself give rise to well-founded fear of persecution.

Id.
229. The Handbook describes "membership in a particular social group," in pertinent part, as follows:
(e) Membership of a particularsocial group
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Stone described in United States v. Carolene Products"1 as requiring special protection.23 2 In other words, because of their particular
minority-group-like status (i.e., status or class distinguishing them
from the majority members of their political communities), they are
more vulnerable to political persecution because they are different or
in some fashion not tolerated.2 33
77. A "particular social group" normally comprises persons of similar background habits or social status. A claim to fear of persecution under this heading may frequently overlap with a claim to fear of persecution on other
grounds, i.e. race, religion or nationality.
Id. at 19.
230. The Handbook describes the term "political opinion," in pertinent part, as
follows:
(f) Politicalopinion
80. Holding political opinions different from those of the Government is not in
itself a ground for claiming refugee status, and an applicant must show that he
has a fear of persecution for holding such opinions. This presupposes that the
applicant holds opinions not tolerated by the authorities which are critical of
their policies or methods. It also presupposes that such opinions have come to
the notice of the authorities or are attributed by them to the applicant. The
political opinions of a teacher or writer may be more manifest than those of a
person in a less exposed position. The relative importance or tenacity of the
applicant's opinions-in so far as this can be established from all the circumstances of the case-will also be relevant.
82 . As indicated above, persecution "for reasons of political opinion" implies
that an applicant holds an opinion that either has been expressed or has come
to the attention of the authorities. There may, however, also be situations in
which the applicant has not given any expression to his opinions. Due to the
strength of his convictions, however, it may be reasonable to assume that his
opinions will sooner or later find expression and that the applicant will, as a
result, come into conflict with the authorities. Where this can reasonably be
assumed, the applicant can be considered to have fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion.
Id. at 19-20.
231. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (the oftcited footnote about the role of the judiciary in protecting minorities). See, e.g., Kevin R.
Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the Executive Branch's Asylum Decisions, UTAH L. REV.
279, 284-85 (1991) (advocating that similar protection be accorded aliens in asylum
adjudications).
232. The protection of refugees is international law's substitute for the protection
that the refugee's homeland cannot or will not provide. Barry N. Stein, The Nature of
the Refugee Problem, in

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER

48 (Alan E. Nash ed., 1987) See generally GOODWIN-GILL, supra
note 38, at 127-48 (examining the content of this protection in greater detail).
233. Moreover, although "persecution" is not defined in either the international
agreements or under United States refugee law, the Ninth Circuit has offered a definition that comports with this notion of difference:
"Persecution" occurs only when there is a difference between the persecutor's
views or status and that of the victim; it is oppression which is inflicted on
groups or individuals because of a difference that the persecutor will not
tolerate.
INTERNATIONAL LAW

On the other hand, the fourth category, "social group," is seem-

ingly a catch-all classification designed to include individuals who do
not readily fit into the previous three groups. International drafters

undoubtedly intended this category to be flexible and open-ended.
Therefore, a "social group" may include members of the majority
community. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the drafters intended all
members of the majority groups to constitute the contemplated social groups subject to persecution without some characteristic that
underscores their "minority-group-like status" in the majority community. As for asylum-seekers claiming persecution on account of
their "political opinion," the drafters may have had in mind those
martyrs or political prisoners willing to advance the cause of their
political beliefs at risk to their personal safety. If so, this definition,234 with its historical roots in the persecution model, is unlikely
to embrace the majority of asylum-seekers who enter or seek to enter
the United States today.

Most asylum-seekers today are members of the majority populations in countries in Central America 23 or the Caribbean, notably
Haiti, whose governments are politically and economically unstable
or experiencing some form of political upheaval, armed conflict, or
civil strife. In these situations, it may be difficult to distinguish between an individual who is persecuted for the active expression of
political views, an individual to whom political beliefs are imputed,
and an individual who is persecuted because of the political motivations of the persecutor. Perhaps (taking moral considerations into account) there should be no distinction between those who can
demonstrate individualized persecution on account of one of the five
listed categories and those who are merely caught in the crossfire or
Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
234. Eligibility for asylum under United States law requires the applicant to
demonstrate that he or she is a "refugee" within the meaning of § 101(a)(42)(A) of the
INA as determined by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1990) defines
a refugee as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality ...who...
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
235. Most asylum-seekers from this region come from Guatemala and El Salvador.
As a matter of strategy, litigating the asylum issues has enabled these applicants to forestall their departure from this country, beginning with the American sanctuary movement of the early eighties and culminating in the landmark settlement in the ABC case.
American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Further,
Congress enacted a safe-haven measure specifically benefitting Salvadorans. In terms of
the numbers already here in the United States, little else could be done. The trend may
be changing in light of the recent arrival of persons without documents or false documents at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York City seeking asylum. See Lorch, supra
note 161; Mehlman, supra note 161. This may be the new wave of asylum-seekers as
civil strife in Central America abates somewhat.
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wrongfully targeted. However, the mere fact that violent conditions
exist in asylum-seekers' home countries is not sufficient, without
more, to qualify them for refugee status under the classic definition.213 Some demonstration of particularized persecution must be
shown. 23 7 Therefore, as long as the present structure for asylum adjudications contemplates individualized determinations, there will be
strenuous attempts to fit individuals into the threshold criteria. That
likelihood is increased by the perception that asylum denials are
based on improper reasons unrelated to the merits of individual
claims.
The distortion of the threshold qualifying criteria in asylum litigation is similar to the litigation activity that occurred after the Supreme Court's decision in Fiallo v. Bell.218 In Fiallo, the Court
upheld congressional line-drawing in denying the fathers, but not the
mothers, of illegitimate offspring (and vice versa) the ability to accord immigration benefits under the INA, notwithstanding the bona
fides of their relationships. 23 9 This bright line-no doubt carrying
some outdated moral overtones-was intended to deal with the possibility of fraud and the concern that establishing immigration benefits
on the grounds of putative fatherhood may be too difficult. The
Court specifically directed the litigants to seek relief from Congress,
indicating that these matters were essentially political and subject to
limited court review only, not intervention. Those litigating complained that applicants who could establish the bona fides of the "father and child" relationship were denied the opportunity to do so.
Consequently, the cases that followed attempted to "squeeze" paternal relationships into other qualifying statutory definitions, such as
236. See, e.g., Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982), in
which the court, affirming the denial of asylum by the BIA to a national of El Salvador,
succinctly stated as follows:
If we were to agree with the petitioner's contention that no person should be
returned to El Salvador because of the reported anarchy present there now, it
would permit the whole population, if they could enter this country some way,
to stay here indefinitely. There must be some special circumstances present
before relief can be granted.
237. Id. at 595-96.
238. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
239. See, e.g., De Los Santos v. INS, 690 F.2d 56 (1982) (upholding the agency's
full equality of rights requirement for legitimation purposes under the Act); Delgado v.
INS, 473 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (critical of the agency's full equality of
rights requirement under the Act as inconsistent with "the foremost policy underlying
the granting of [immigration preferences]"); Kaliski v. District Director, 620 F.2d 214
(9th Cir. 1980) (court treated beneficiary as "legitimated" son under California law even
though petitioner, now domiciled in California, and son both lived in Yugoslavia at the
critical time for legitimation purposes under the Act).

"stepchild" or "legitimated" child. 240 It is anticipated that the legislative intervention of the 1986 amendments to the INA, providing
for the recognition of most relationships between fathers and their
illegitimate offspring for immigration purposes, will greatly reduce
this litigation. 4 1
3.

The Shortcomings of a Judicial Approach

The process of judicial review is evolutionary in nature. It is a
deliberative process that contemplates a broad delegation to the
agency to fill in the contours of general terms. An agency's interpre24 2
tation of statutes, if reasonable, is usually given due deference.
Given the plenary nature of the sovereign's power over its borders,
immigration determinations have been viewed as largely discretionary with only limited review in the courts. In asylum adjudication,
therefore, widely varying statutory interpretations in individual cases
may camouflage widely varying viewpoints-political or otherwise-about who should qualify for refugee status. As Professors
Aleinikoff and Martin observe, "When the standard is this vague,
there remains plenty of room for manipulation, by those who favor a
less generous policy as well as by those who favor a more generous
one."2 43 In the distant past, an adjudicative approach to resolving the
differences in interpretation may have proved satisfactory, but this is
not the case in immigration today.
For example, lower courts have become increasingly interventionist in "extreme hardship" cases in recent years.2 44 As the regular
immigration system became less and less able to meet current immigration needs, individual litigants turned to the courts for justice. At
the same time, the usual deference to the agency's interpretations
was given less and less readily because of a growing mistrust of the
INS. This mistrust grew more pronounced during the eighties, as the
Reagan administration implemented controversial policies designed
to stem the tide of asylum-seekers coming into this country. 245
240. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 690.

241. Id.
242. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984).
243. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 690.
244. "Faced with what they deemed to be compelling humanitarian concerns, the
courts have distinguished, explained, and misunderstood [Supreme Court precedent in
the area]." Id. at 627. See also Note, Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy
and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1396 (1983).
245. See generally ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 832-39. When the

Reagan administration implemented these new policies of deterrence, critics quickly asserted that the government had acted improperly to exclude eligible asylum-seekers for
political reasons contrary to congressional intent. See, e.g., Helton, supra note 60; see
also Arthur C. Helton, The Legality of Detaining Refugees in the United States, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 353 (1986).
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Although asylum litigation has been instructive, it has produced
-less than satisfactory results in resolving the fundamental issues.
Thus far, an adjudicatory approach has resulted in several splits in
the circuits on the key issues, and several issues still remain open
questions.24 6 As a rule, the Supreme Court has not spoken with sufficient clarity in resolving asylum issues."' To date, further resolution

necessary with each issue that the
in the Supreme Court has been
2 48
Court has seemingly resolved.
Notwithstanding the complexities of the legislative process,24 9 a
legislative approach has several advantages over reliance upon the

courts to resolve the remaining key issues. First, issues in immigration law tend to defy definitive court resolution. As Professor Peter

Schuck observed, immigration is the only area of American law that
has remained immune to the kind of ongoing case law development

found in other areas. 250 What case law there is requires judges to
defer to statutes and agency determinations.

51

Thus, the formal role

of the judiciary is ordinarily quite limited. Second, the traditional
role of the courts is not that of policy makers. 2 As a rule, changes
in the law occur incrementally and then only at the margins. 253 Even
246. For example, in INS v. Elias-Zacarias,the Supreme Court did not decide
whether "neutrality" or "imputed" political opinion qualified for asylum relief under the
definition. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
247. Smith & Hake, supra note 100.
248. For example, with INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984), the problem of two
standards of proof for persecution claims arose. Before, all who participated in the debate
assumed that one or the other standard was applicable to both claims. Then, with INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421 (1987), the Court ordained the development via case-bycase determination, instead of providing guidelines.
249. Jonathan L. Entin, Congress, The President,and The Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Value of Litigation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 50 (1991).
250. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1984) (Immigration law has long been considered "a maverick.., in our public
law ... so radically insulated and divergent from those fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role that animate the rest of our legal
system."). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMM. 9 (1990) ("Immigration law inhabits the backwaters of constitutional jurisprudence."); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation,400 YALE
L.J. 545 (1990).
251. E.g., INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981). See also, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (Congressional power "largely immune" from judicial review);
but see id. at 793 n.5 (accepting a "limited" judicial responsibility to review even those
congressional decisions concerning the exclusion of aliens).
252. To the extent that these remaining issues implicate other policy considerations, the legislative and executive branches of government have a greater claim to making policy choices than the judiciary. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
253. Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Pdlicy, 58

though the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Elias-Zacariasmay
have clarified at least one aspect of the underlying legal standards,25 '
animated congressional action is still necessary to give more definitive expression to the characteristics of who should qualify for asylum relief and under what circumstances in this "politically
charged" area of the immigration law.2 55
Another shortcoming of the judicial process in resolving the debate is that judges are, as a rule, generalists. 2 0 Agencies or adjudicatory bodies, on the other hand, are specialists in their area of
responsibility.257 Moreover, they have a broader perspective on the
impact of their determinations because they deal with a broader
group of individuals seeking administrative relief on a regular basis.
In short, agency adjudicators are able to see the big picture. As
Judge Goodwin wrote in a dissenting opinion to an immigration case
involving the issue of "extreme hardship" (the most litigated issue
before asylum issues supplanted its reign),25s persistent resort to the
courts "is likely to shift the administration of hardship deportation
cases from the Immigration and Naturalization Service to this
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 822 (1990).
254. The Court's decision in this case has most likely determined the extent the
phrase "on account of political opinion" may be interpreted to include an individual who
has not expressed or made known to reasonably likely persecutors any particular political
beliefs or views the asylum-seeker may hold individually. However, because the Court
essentially concluded that the applicant's evidence was insufficient in this case, it is not
entirely clear that this clarity has been reached on the issue of how broadly the phrase
can be interpreted. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit, on remand from the Supreme Court,
concluded in Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992), that persecution
based on imputed political opinion was still a valid basis for relief after the Court's decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias.
255. But see Legomsky, supra note 22, at 2014:
A multiplicity of judicial views contributes to the thoughtful evolution of the
law. If the occasional split between circuits raises a sufficiently important issue
for which consistency is desirable, the Supreme Court can restore the needed
uniformity. In discharging that function, the Court may evaluate the diverging
viewpoints of the lower courts. Access to differing views is unusually valuable
in an area as politically charged as asylum. Such debate is essential in cases
whose outcomes often depend on deeply-held personal notions of social obligation, foreign policy, national community, and our nation's place within, and
obligations to, the world community.
256. See generally STEPHEN H. LEGOAISKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, AND A CROSS-NATIONAL

THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION

(1987)

(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of adjudication by specialists).
257. See David R. Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 332 (1979):
This expertise [agency familiarity with and sophistication about the statutes
they are charged with administering] is assumed to result not only from the
frequency of an agency's contact with the statute, but also from its immersion
in day-to-day administrative operations that reveal the practical consequences
of one statutory interpretation as opposed to another.
Id.
258. See generally ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 620-38.
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court."2'59 This appears to be the situation with asylum today. Moreover, local factors may influence case outcomes in a region that is
more affected by the influx of asylum-seekers than others. Which
persons receive relief may therefore depend on the sheer fortuity of
geography.
Lastly, as noted above, courts address only the particulars of the
case before them. The Ninth Circuit attempted to establish per se
rules for a particular set of circumstances. However, the Supreme
Court, in Elias-Zacarias,found those rules not contemplated by the
statute.
In the final analysis, asylum involves policy choices. Asylum is not
mandated by international obligations. Further, it implicates domestic policy issues, matters that are largely left to the political departments of government. The result is that limited immigration
opportunities in general require some "hard look" approaches to immigration benefits eligibility. Thus, the decision as to which persons
qualify for refugee relief ought to be played out in a political setting.
For example, Congress can determine whether "draft resisters" or
"neutrals". should be accorded asylum relief and, if so, under what
circumstances. The courts are simply not equipped to undertake this
kind of political debate.
B.

The Basic Contours
1. In General

260
Until Congress acts to clarify "existing adjudicatory practice,
the problem of defining appropriate contours for the legal standards
that have heretofore provided grist for court litigation will continue
unabated. "Ambiguous legislation, as the ambiguity appears in a
given case, typically suggests that Congress has not concretely resolved 2the policy issue that the case presents."' 26 ' That is the problem
6
here.

259. Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341, 1351 (9th Cir. 1980) (Goodwin, J., dissenting),
rev'd, INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
260. Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 6.
261. Silberman, supra note 253, at 823.
262. The commentator further opines:
Or it may be that a particular eventuality or series of events was simply not
foreseen-even dimly. Or it may be that the legislative draftsmen were less
than exacting so that congressional policy decisions were not reflected precisely
in the legislation (or in the legislative history). Although deference may seem
most appropriate when Congress chooses language that implies deference, in all
of these circumstances, to a greater or lesser extent, whoever interprets the

Admittedly, there is value in setting forth general and broad language when little is known about the contours of specific terms or
definitional standards. 263 This approach allows for reflection in defining the correct parameters of the governing provisions. However, resolution in a deliberative (i.e., judicial) fashion is not necessarily the
wiser course at this juncture. Present-day refugee crises require a
more definitive approach. Moreover, a legislative process would seem
better suited to entertain the kind of policy (i.e., political) debate the
asylum issues have thus far engendered. It is not the point of this
Article to argue for a lesser role of the courts. On the contrary, it is
entirely appropriate for courts to review agency determinations that
transgress the stated legal parameters, or are incorrect, or are tantamount to an abuse of discretion. But in the area of asylum, this review needs legislative guidance concerning the basic contours of the
pertinent provisions.
2. The Substantive Content
All things considered, Congress should, in effect, take a narrowconstruction approach in amending the pertinent statutory provisions. Specifically, the INA should be amended to more clearly define what is intended by the relevant terms. Under the present
statutory scheme, "on account of... political opinion," followed by
"on account of ... membership in a particular social group," are the
two categories listed under the refugee definition that have received
the most attention in the literature and the courts. The remaining
categories are self-explanatory; no doubt, meeting the threshold criteria is a fairly straightforward proposition for the asylum-seeker
who can establish refugee status on the basis of one of the first three
categories. These particular grounds have not been hotly debated in
courts or the literature, and they are unlikely to be the subject of
debate in the foreseeable future.26 4
The "political opinion" ground is the most common basis for an
statute will often have room to choose between two or more plausible interpretations. That sort of choice implicates and sometimes squarely involves policy
making. The agencies-even the independent ones-have superior political
standing to the life-tenured federal judiciary in performing that policy making
function.
Id.

263. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized the value of this approach in deciding
the appropriate standard of proof for asylum claims when the Court declined to dictate
how the lowered standard of proof ought to be implemented. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
264. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 225, 11 66-86 at 17-21 for the Handbook's
guidelines on appropriate criteria for determining eligibility under these five enumerated
categories.
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asylum claim in the United States today. 265 "Membership in a particular social group" may be the most vague and elusive of the five
enumerated categories. Because of its vagueness, the "social group"
category is used less often, but its flexible nature may be utilized
more in the future. Thus, the need to provide clarity here is paramount. The listed categories still seemingly underscore the distinct
"minority group" quality of the qualifying criteria. 266 As the government has argued, unless narrowly construed, the "social group" and
"political opinion" categories have the potential for including whole
nations of people.267 Indeed, this was undoubtedly the basis for congressional reluctance during earlier legislative sessions to accord
safe-haven relief to Salvadorans who were fleeing their war-torn
nation. 6
In judging asylum claims based on "membership in a particular
social group," the BIA has imposed the following standard: "the
common characteristic that defines the group ... must be one that
the members of the group cannot change, or should not be required
to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
consciences. 2 69 Commentators view this category as a flexible catchall that broadly encompasses "many groups who do not otherwise
fall within the other categories of race, nationality, religion, or political opinion. ' 270 This was "a common theme in many Salvadoran
cases in the 1980s. ''271 Interestingly, a Ninth Circuit panel ruled
265. See, e.g., Linda D. Bevis, Note, "PoliticalOpinions" of Refugees: Interpreting InternationalSources, 63 WASH. L. REV. 395, 395 (1988) (noting that no interpretation of "persecution on account of political opinion" is consistently applied in United
States asylum law).
266. For example, consider the plight of the Eta people of Japan. Although they
may look no different from other Japanese people, they are considered outcasts (i.e.,
"viewed as a racial minority") and are the target of discriminatory treatment in Japan.
Maureen Graves, From Definition to Exploration"Social Groups and PoliticalAsylum
Eligibility, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 739, 803 (1989) (citing M. HANE, PEASANTS, REBELS,
AND OUTCASTS 139-43 (1982)).

267. See, e.g., Appellant's Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 9, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112
S. Ct. 812 (1992) (No. 90-1342). See also Aleinikoff, supra note 15, at 9:
The Board clearly recognizes that liberal readings of the asylum provisions will
only increase the number of applications; and, indeed, given the level of international instability, such interpretations could render a large portion of the
world's population eligible for asylum.
Id.
268. Mims, supra note 207.
269. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
270. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1573 (9th Cir. 1986).
271. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 813. See also Graves, supra note
266, at 748 (noting that "international drafting history and other states' interpretations-both before and after 1980-make plain that 'social group' was intended to be

that there were limits to the phrase's expansiveness.27 2 The BIA,
however, has no doubt required the quality of "immutability" as a
way to circumscribe an otherwise "catch-all" qualifying category.
The "political opinion" category has been the most fertile ground
for expanding the definition in civil war situations.2 7 As the Handbook indicates, some expression of political beliefs, whether communicated to the persecutor or not, is what is seemingly intended.
However, the plain meaning of that phrase would suggest political
views and beliefs and not merely political circumstances or motivations. Thus, Congress should underscore this interpretation by specifically incorporating it into a new definition section of the amended
statutory provisions. As Judge Sneed has written, to conclude otherwise "demeans the true martyr for whom asylum was intended. 27 4
Therefore, to the extent the present system encourages manipulation
of asylum law by either side, filling in the contours of the statutory
gaps in content ought first to be debated in the political arena and
not the courts. Thus, Congress should amend the asylum provisions
by setting forth more precise criteria or guidelines for determining
asylum applications in the form of a definition section.
The definition section would specifically address the terms of the
interpreted broadly").
272. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1573 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, the
court rejected the claim of a Salvadoran that he was a member of the following group:
"young, urban, working class males of military age who had never served in the military
or otherwise expressed support for the government." The court reasoned as follows:
The statutory words "particular" and "social" which modify "group," indicate that the term does not encompass every broadly defined segment of a population, even if a certain demographic division does have some statistical
relevance. Instead, the phrase "particularsocial group" implies a collection of
people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common
impulse or interest. Of central concern is the existence of a voluntary associational relationship among the purported members, which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that
discrete social group.
Id. at 1576 (footnote omitted).
273.- See, e.g., Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984) (triggering the application of neutrality as an "imputed political opinion" under the refugee
definition); but see M.A. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (stating
that "[ilt is unclear whether neutrality can be considered a "political opinion" within the
meaning of the Refugee Act"); Perlera-Escobar v. EOIR, 894 F.2d 1292, 1298 (1Ith
Cir. 1990) (stating that "[i]n the context of a civil war ... the BIA has declined to apply
the principle that a desire to remain neutral is an expression of a political opinion for
purposes of asylum and withholding of deportation"). The court further stated that an
expansive interpretation of the meaning of "political opinion" would "create a sinkhole
that would swalldw the rule." Perlera-Escobar,894 F.2d at 1298.
Further, BIA member Heilman, vigorously dissenting in a case in which the BIA reluctantly followed Ninth Circuit precedent, states that "the only reason to speak in terms
of imputed political opinion is to 'pigeon-hole' the case within one of the five categories
set forth in the law for asylum." ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 805 (citing
In re Juan (BIA 1989), an unpublished Board opinion).
274. Mendoza-Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 767-68 (9th Cir. 1990) (Sneed, J.,
concurring).
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classic "refugee" definition for purposes of asylum relief. For instance, the "on account of" doctrine might be limited to those asylum-seekers who demonstrate the kind of refugee status within the
scope of section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA denoting the idea of political activism.17 5 Definition of this kind would establish congressional intent as to asylum eligibility 276 and allow courts to satisfy
themselves that each determination was consistent with congressional intent.
Interestingly, only African states have adopted a definition broad
enough to accommodate categories of need not covered by the
United Nations Convention definition. However, as one international
scholar has suggested, "African solidarity and mutual assistance -in
the name of independence was a moral imperative. Ethnic groups
frequently cut across state boundaries and made it easy to accept
new arrivals. Repatriation, moreover was-and is-a frequent solution. 277 This is not the case in the United States. Here, numbers
still matter in the asylum debate. Indeed, numbers are the reason
advocated for the narrow, grudging construction of the qualifying
terms. Once the decision is made that numbers are important, then
control of those numbers is a matter for public debate. However,
because asylum may be sought even by unlawful entrants under present law, some other control mechanism must be in place.
Presently, there is no clear definition of "persecution." This may
be appropriate, given the endless variety of situations the term might
cover. 278 However, whether or not persecution has occurred is a decidedly different question from whether or not the reason for the persecution falls within one of the five qualifying categories. The latter
should remain a matter to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Thus,
for asylum purposes only, a more restrictive definition of the five
275. Some clarity on the issue of imputed political opinion is needed. Even though
the individual may not hold political views inimical to the government, if the evidence
establishes those views are indeed imputed to the individual, then it is probably sufficient
to qualify him or her for asylum on account of political opinion. But this situation is
likely to arise because the individual is engaged in some sort of political activity in which
the likelihood of imputation of the political views of another is apparent.
276. One proposal for more consistency in applying appropriate criteria to asylum
determinations offers the Handbook sections as an appropriate starting point. Linda D.
Bevis, Note, "Political Opinions" of Refugees: Interpreting International Sources, 63
WASH. L. REV. 395, 409 (1988).
277. Suhrke, supra note 48, at 160. The author further notes that, because these
refugee movements did not "typically flow from very poor to very rich states," the refugees had no strong incentive to remain in the country of first asylum once the conflict
ceased in their homelands. Id.
278.

GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 38, at 40.

enumerated categories would be consistent with other policy considerations and
not necessarily inconsistent with international
79
obligations.1
When a more expansive definition is needed, Congress might delegate to the agency rule-making authority for determining situations
that go beyond the import of the plain language of the categories.
For example, the term "social group" was seemingly intended by the
United Nations convention drafters as a "catch-all" category. To the
extent that Congress wishes to permit a more flexible interpretation,
it could leave to the agency, through the rule-making process which
contemplates public opinion, the definition of the specific contours of
this particular phrase. However, Congress could indicate its intent in
the definitions section as to whether any expansiveness should be
limited to members of a social group who are treated like minorities
within their country. (For example, the Eta people in Japan.) Yet, a
restrictive definition of some kind is essential for the term "political
opinion" because it is not susceptible to a minority-group-like status
interpretation as it contemplates more specific conduct or activity.
Otherwise, the system will be placed under impossible strain. International scholars have recognized this potential for over-loading the
system and have offered other "durable" solutions. 28 0 But because
resettlement is the preferred solution for those seeking asylum in the
industrialized states, only a restrictive definition would seem to be
appropriate.
A separate but perhaps more important issue is the need for temporary refuge. Congress has addressed this issue with the recent enactment of a much-lobbied-for safe-haven measure. However, the
provision essentially leaves to the discretion of the Attorney General,
in consultation with other agencies, the question of which foreign
nationals will be accorded temporary protected status in the future.
Compassionate responses are to be commended, but there are no
easy answers, On the contrary, there are only very hard political
choices. Had clear-cut guidelines been in place, the kind of "hardline" decisions that critics now complain about might have been
avoided."'
279. International agreements only mandate non-refoulement and leave the matter
of a more permanent asylum measure to the nation-state.
280. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 42, at 134 (recommending that nation-states
"dispense with a formal universal commitment to the provision of secure conditions of
exile" and instead emphasize "regional and interest-driven protection in tandem with a
general obligation to share the burden of addressing refugee needs"); see also J.-P. L.
Fonteyne, Burden-Sharing: An Analysis of the Nature and Function of International
Solidarity in Cases of Mass Influx of Refugees, 8 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 162, 166-67
(1983) (addressing the need for "an effective international refugee policy" of burdensharing in light of the problems associated with the phenomenon of mass flows of asylum-seekers, regardless of their universal classifications).
281. See also David A. Martin, Comparative Policies on Political Asylum: Of
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3.

The Benefits of Statutory Guidelines

The agency's role is typically one in which it makes determinations left largely to its discretion by Congress in order to decide the
contours or parameters of the available relief.2 8 2 This is particularly
so in the area of immigration because these matters are inherently
the product of the plenary power of the sovereign and immune from
judicial scrutiny. 28 3 Because of the uniquely compelling issues that
surround asylum adjudications and the ongoing debate, this process
is extremely difficult to accomplish unless the decision-making is
somewhat circumscribed.
In setting forth the criteria for agency decision-making with clarity and precision, Congress can, in effect, legislatively depoliticize
the process. Charges that the agency is manipulating the process to
achieve its enforcement goals might abate if the qualifying grounds
were less susceptible to misinterpretation. 84 More importantly, precise criteria would reduce the need for discretionary and arbitrary
decisions. But precise criteria are more than a matter of "administrative convenience. 2 8 5 They increase the likelihood that similarly
situated individuals will be treated similarly. Of course, the problem
of assessing the credibility and ultimate predictive value of the evidentiary presentations still remains, but the provision for specialized
adjudicators in the new asylum regulations should enhance the integrity of these determinations.
The application of precise criteria to the in-state asylum program
could counterbalance the perception that asylum-seekers entering the
United States by means of their geographical proximity do so to the
disadvantage of those who must await abroad for processing under
the overseas refugee program. In tightening the criteria for in-state
allocation of refugee status to those who have conceptually "jumped
the queue," the agency can lessen the perceived disadvantages of not
being in the right geographical location.
Facts and Law, 9 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 105, 108 (1987) (noting that "restrictive
legal doctrine is a compensating mechanism-compensating for inadequate means within
the system to assess the facts of the case competently"). In these situations, the decisionmakers would be required to deal appropriately with the credibility issues once the criteria are prescribed with specificity.
282. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
283. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522
(1954).
284. See Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 10 (noting that more clarity is needed in the
underlying legal standards (or qualifying grounds)).
285. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65 (1983).

When a narrow statutory definition is used to fill in the contours
of the definitional standards, asylum presents less opportunity for an
end-run around the regular immigration system. It should be emphasized that the question of whether the applicant has a bona fide asylum claim remains quite separate; but, to the extent that the
construction is narrowed to discrete groups, information on the treatment of these groups in foreign countries is more easily gathered.
This works both ways: the ultimate predictive judgment that comes
to bear on whether there is a reasonable possibility of persecution in
an individual case is aided by the group-based evidence, with the
result that the tremendous evidentiary burden carried by the asylumseeker is lessened.
Once an interpretation extends past the "ordinary and common
sense" understanding of an intended meaning, a great number of
variables (i.e., policy considerations) come into play. There may be
reason to take account of these variables. After all, if a neighbor is
fleeing life-threatening conditions in his or her homeland, why should
the reasons that caused the flight matter? Yet, the international
community answered that question some forty years ago when it
adopted a uniform definition of "refugee" that limited protection to
persecution on account of five listed grounds.
4.

The Rationalefor a Legislative Approach

Over the past decade, significant improvements have been
achieved in immigration administration at the legislative level.28" But
none of these improvements have dealt directly with the substantive
aspects of the asylum process. Congress may prudently be taking a
"wait-and-see" approach, following the recent asylum regulations.
However, this cautious posture may not be appropriate in light of the
increased numbers of asylum-seekers. Even though relatively few are
granted asylum, their numbers could create a "magnet" effect,
drawing others. It is significant that a dispute over numbers is still at
the core of the asylum debate.287
Because the Supreme Court is likely to continue to apply the plain
meaning rule in interpreting the asylum provisions, any amendment
to the statutory language to provide greater clarity as to congressional intent will guide the courts directly in their review of the
286. See, e.g., IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359; Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537; Immigration Nursing
Relief Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-238, § 2, 103 Stat. 2099; Immigration Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
287. Note that the recent asylum regulations do much to ensure a more fair and
efficient process of asylum adjudication. See Martin, Reforming Asylum, supra note 14,
at 1276-80. Still, the specter of numbers out of control remains a constant reminder that
a more substantive reform measure is needed.
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agency's decisions. As a rule, "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 2 8 Unfortunately, this rule, stated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
NaturalResources Defense Council is less clear about interpretation
of statutes when congressional intent is not plainly discoverable.
Nonetheless, to the extent the issue is close or, rather, ambiguous,
Chevron commands that the court defer to a reasonable administrative interpretation. Courts have been less inclined to do so in this
particular area, however. Distrust of the agency has arisen due to a
perception that political influences guide administrative decisionmaking policies. As a result, courts have often substituted their own
judgment for the agency's as to who ought to receive a grant of
asylum.289
A legislative initiative that established more precise parameters to
guide the agency's discretion would be likely to bolster the deference
that courts usually accord an agency's interpretation of the statutes
it administers and enforces. In other words, under the new asylum
order as dictated by Congress, with more definitive criteria for deciding asylum cases, reviewing courts ought to be able to limit their role
to ensuring that agency determinations are made in fair proceedings,
under0 clearly articulated standards consistent with the applicable
law.29
Presently, too few asylum-seekers will qualify under the international definition unless the definitional standards are expanded legislatively to include them. 91 This is particularly so in light of INS v.
Elias-Zacarias,the Supreme Court's most recent asylum decision.
288. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984).
289. See, e.g., Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341, 1351 (1980) (Sneed, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
I acknowledge that the administrative actions of the INS and the BIA do

not always inspire the casual observer with confidence. This is regrettable. Our
sporadic forays into the area, blinded as we must be by the nature of the judicial process, are not likely to improve the situation.

Id.
290. See generally Diver, supra note 285, at 108 (arguing that courts should exercise broad deference to administrators' choice of rule formulations, intervening to make
sure the rules are fair and applied properly). In asylum cases (as with other humanitarian-based immigration relief measures), courts will usually intervene, under the guise of
interpreting the law, to provide relief that is not necessarily contemplated by the statute.
This has been the situation involving immigration matters because litigants in particular,
and courts, are essentially mistrustful of the INS, the agency charged with rule-making
authority in the area of asylum law.
291. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Expanding the InternationalDefinition of Refugee:

As one observer has commented, the Court's ruling leaves unresolved
what is to be done for those people who manage to escape the dangerous conditions in their homelands to seek refuge in the United
States.2 92 Moreover, because the governing standards are vague and
difficult to apply, there is ample room for controversy about whether

political considerations have intruded on the decisions.2 93 Thus, if the
courts are unable to provide clarity in this area, Congress needs to
settle the dispute with clear-cut guidelines. Congress is the appropriate body to resolve the issues because of the policy choices implicated in the asylum debate.
As suggested earlier, Congress did not contemplate that the current statutory scheme would accommodate large influxes of asylumseekers. The primary concern of Congress was to codify provisions in
the statute that would ensure the availability of political asylum for
individuals physically present in the United States who may or may
not be in lawful status. Essentially, the legislators delegated the establishment of the asylum adjudication process to the Attorney General. 94 Therefore, other than generalities about the purpose of
refugee protection, it is unlikely that any congressional intent can be
found concerning the specific content of the asylum provisions. In
addition, as noted above, the recent passage of safe-haven legislation
providing for temporary protected status to large groups of people is
only a partial, short-term solution. Moreover, Congress has left the
granting of temporary protected status in future cases to the
agency.295
A Multicultural View, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 35 (1989-1990) (describing how two hypothetical women from the same country might be treated differently in terms of qualifying under the international definition of "refugee"):
Both of these hypothetical women are representative of the plight of hundreds of thousands of forced migrants. While both would be commonly perceived as "refugees," there is a disparity in their treatment under prevailing
international [footnote omitted] law. Although international law would recognize the city dweller as a refugee due to her "well-founded fear of being persecuted," it would not recognize the village dweller because her fear stems solely
from war and civil strife.
Id. at 35 (footnote omitted). The author goes on to argue that the international definition
of "refugee" should be expanded to include the village dweller as well, because both face
the possibility of death. Id.
292. High Court Restrictive on PoliticalAsylum, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at
A3 (quoting Warren Leiden, Executive Director of the American Immigration Lawyers
Association). A counter view was offered by Dan Stein, Executive Director of the Federation of America for Immigration Reform: "Asylum ... was designed to provide temporary protection to people in danger, not as a fast way around immigration quotas." Id.
293. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 695.
294. See INA § 208(a) (1990) (stating that it is the A.G. who shall establish a
procedure, in stark contrast to the more statutory-prescribed procedure set forth in § 207
for the overseas refugee program).
295. See Immigration Act of 1990 § 302, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (Supp. 11). Also,
this provision is another indication that Congress intended to leave these kinds of policy
choices (i.e., nationals to whom temporary refuge will be accorded) to the Executive
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A legislative intervention designed to craft greater specificity into
the statutory provisions is not without its pitfalls.2" 6 But the process
of adjudication on a case-by-case basis does not appear to be suitable
for handling large numbers of asylum applications, and this is reflected in the low numbers of grants. Courts have become involved in
deciding what are essentially policy issues.29 7 As Judge Sneed noted,
courts see only the one case before them and are not in the position
of the agency, which handles volumes.29 8 More important, the inherent mistrust of the agency in promulgating appropriate criteria, and

the accusation of political manipulation of the process, virtually compel legislative intervention.
A legislative approach is appropriate also because courts are unlikely to settle an asylum matter for very long, if history is any indicator.2 99 This is primarily because current case law has developed
under a set of circumstances that was not originally designed to accommodate the new refugee movements and the increased numbers
Branch and not the courts.
296. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 253, at 825:
Finding a specific congressional intent is particularly unlikely if the agency is
applying statutory language that calls for an administrative judgment, such as
what is "feasible" or "probable." But often there is also ambiguity when statutes are extensively detailed, because the more Congress writes the more difficulty it seems to have making legislation clear. That should not be all that
surprising when one thinks about it: the more detailed the instructions drafted
in an effort to anticipate every twist and turn that a regulation will undergo,
the more likely it is-given the difficulty in predicting human behavior-that a
draftsman will create ambiguity.
Id. That is why I suggest that the legislative process be informed by the current case law,
international guidelines, and commentary on the meaning and content of the qualifying
criteria. Nonetheless, some measure of clarity is needed if for no other reason than to
establish whether asylum determinations are to be broadened or narrowed.
297. See, e.g., Mark G. Yudof, Equal EducationalOpportunities and the Courts,
51 TEX. L. REV. 411, 413 (1973) (noting, in the context of issues of educational inequalities, that "courts are institutionally incapable of performing a full-fledged legislative
role").
298. Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341 (1980) (Sneed, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom.,
INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
299. Four years after the Refugee Act's passage, the Supreme Court decided
Stevic. Leading up to that first asylum decision were several circuit splits. The intervening three years leading up to the Court's landmark asylum decision in Cardoza-Fonseca
brought about a number of circuit splits as well. Although the Court's decision in EliasZacariasseemed to narrow the legal definition for asylum, courts are still pursuing expansive readings of the phrase "on account of ... political opinion." See, e.g., CanasSegovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that persecution based on imputed political opinion is still a valid basis for relief after the Supreme Court's decision in
INS v. Elias-Zacarias.)Asylum issues will continue to arise because courts will continue
to feel the tension between policy considerations (inherently political) and humanitarian
concerns.

of asylum-seekers.30
Now that the new asylum regulations have reformed many procedural aspects of the adjudication process, a more substantive reform
measure would seem in order. What now remains is a legislative prescription for more clarity in defining the qualifying grounds for eligibility. With more precise terms and definitions, the agency can focus
its attention on its primary role of administering and implementing
immigration laws and the courts can focus their attention on review,
ensuring agency compliance with congressional intent.
There is a current fear that an expansive interpretation of asylum
law will open the floodgates of immigration. Simultaneously, there is
more information available about refugee movements and the numbers likely to fill the various categories designated as eligible for asylum relief. Both are reasons for Congress to act. Although a narrow
or restrictive construction of the definitional standards would address
current concerns, a narrow construction need not be inconsistent
with the original intent of the universal definition. Moreover, a
highly specific legislative proposal would direct the agency's decision-making in a predictable way, allowing for greater scrutiny by
the courts, but less court intervention.
In addition to directing agency discretion, congressionally enacted
guidelines or criteria would contain the unpredictability of courts
that are inclined to activism. Thus, to the extent that the Supreme
Court is moving in the direction of adopting the "plain meaning"
rule for purposes of statutory interpretation in general, and immigration law in particular, these guidelines are needed. 30 1
More important, legislative closure of the remaining key asylum
issues will afford an opportunity to consider categories of refugees
who do not fit the convention definition. Applying outdated and inadequate asylum provisions would almost certainly be inconsistent with
300. From the Refugee Policy Group Report:
Less often has this country been a place of first asylum, with political exiles
arriving unbidden on our shores. However, direct arrival of political migrants
has been increasingly a factor in U.S. immigration policy during the past two
decades, beginning with the Cuban exiles of the 1960's. In fact, within a few
months of passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, 125,000 Cubans arrived on our
shores and sought refuge. Since then thousands of others from throughout the
world have sought safe haven in the United States. Some have sought political
asylum; many others remain illegally in this country, requesting relief from
deportation only if they are apprehended.
GALLAGHER ET AL.,

301.

supra note 8, at 2.

Of particular note here is the Supreme Court's opinion in INS v. Phinpathya,

464 U.S. 183 (1984), in which the Court rejected a lenient agency interpretation because
it was considered to be at odds with the plain meaning of a congressional enactment. A

subsequent Congress, however, "overturned" the Court's decision by amending the provision in question to allow for a more lenient approach to relief. In any event, the Court in
Phinpathya essentially said that if Congress meant what the agency interpreted their
intent to be, then Congress should have specifically stated so in clear language.
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the intent of Congress in 1980 and ineffective in resolving the current problems of protection.3 02 We are all members of one global
community, and we cannot say that one individual is more deserving
of safe haven than another. 03 As a practical matter, however,
United States immigration law is not based on an open border policy. Therefore, it is unlikely that any refugee policy based solely on
humanitarian factors will outweigh considerations of domestic policies that may conflict. Although the temptation to contract the definition is undeniable, the inevitable sympathy that refugees evoke will
exert a counter pressure for more expansive coverage or other types
of refugee-like relief.

CONCLUSION

While the approach recommended here does not aspire to solve all
the problems, a judicial resolution of the issues is problematic for all

302. At the international level this issue is being played out as well. Thus, the
international community may reconvene as it did in 1951 to fashion a more appropriate
definition for refugee protection or adopt durable solutions and accords among nationstates to resolve the problem. See Mary M. Kritz, Introduction Overview, in U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY: GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC ISSUES 1, 11 (Mary M. Kritz
ed., 1983) ("The shifting international realities of the world may require new concepts,
categories, and definitions appropriate to transnational movements of population."); see
also Suhrke, supra note 48, at 169-70 (concluding that the current United Nations definition has its limitations and thus recommending that studies of "the causes of refugee
movements, determinants of public policy, and alternative strategies to resettlement" be
pursued).
303. As observed by refugee scholars:
Our analysis of contemporary refugee movements [has] delineated three sociological types of refugees: (1) the activist, (2) the target, and (3) the victim ....
What all three have in common is fear of immediate
violence-violence resulting from conflict between state and civil society, between opposing armies, or conflict among ethnic groups or class formations that
the state is unable or unwilling to control. Whether the individuals are activists
or passive bystanders simply caught in the conflict is immaterial from the point
of view of their immediate security. Their need clearly could be the same regardless of the cause, and has demonstrably been so in many of the cases analyzed. It follows that in a historical and normative sense, the three types of
refugees are equally deserving. The activist, the target, and the victim have an
equally valid claim to protection from the international community.
R. ZOLBERG ET AL., ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND THE REFUGEE
CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 269 (1989). But a line must be drawn between those
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accorded asylum and those denied relief. By adopting the United Nations Convention
definition as the legal standard in the United States, Congress has delineated the qualifying categories even further.

of the reasons discussed above.30 4 Until the global community addresses the issue of refugee protection more comprehensively, this
proposal affords Congress an opportunity to bring some semblance of
order to the asylum adjudication process. A legislative approach at
this juncture would provide more structure to the agency's adjudication process by bringing greater clarity to the requisite threshold criteria. At the same time, providing this clarity would also constrain
agency discretion. Thus, in addition to being guided in its asylum
determinations, the agency would also, in effect, be relieved of the
necessity of using its own interpretations of the refugee definition as
a ruse to control United States borders, as administration critics
have contended. Ultimately then, this approach may restore some
measure of trust in agency determinations by providing directive
statutory language less susceptible to varying interpretations.
Notwithstanding the specific proposal recommended here, a legislative approach to resolving the problem would afford all interested
parties an opportunity to participate in the political process. For the
most part, the legislative process has worked thus far in establishing
much needed immigration reform and temporary refuge relief for
those who have fled civil war and violence in their homelands. Congress can draw on the diverse fund of legal commentaries and judicial views on the issues affecting asylum adjudications. Furthermore,
this approach could potentially curtail judicial intervention, allowing
more expeditious adjudication, predictability, and ultimately a reduction of the present applications backlog. 305 None of the above is
intended to suggest that the legislative task will not be without its
problems; the very nature of asylum adjudication is fraught with
human and social policy complexities. 0 6
As more and more asylum-seekers from nearby nations reach
United States borders, the inherent tension between the American
immigrant tradition based primarily on family reunification and
United States obligations under international law will continue to
strain public support for comprehensive asylum relief. In recommending an approach that revamps the substantive aspects of the
process, all partisans can redirect their energies toward formulating
a policy able to address the plight of the refugees who seek refuge in
the United States today.
Finally, the real concern of the federal, as well as local and state
304. As once observed:
Asylum law is complicated. There is much confusion in the case law as to
where one question ends and the next begins, and every decision puts a unique
spin on the analysis. The analytical structure of many opinions should be taken
with a grain of salt.
Smith & Hake, supra note 100, at 19.
305. Martin, Reforming Asylum, supra note 14, at 1249.
306. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 692.
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governments, is the numbers of asylum-seekers likely to enter the
United States without authorization and the inability to control
those numbers and their impact on local communities. The asylum
debate is, as a practical matter, about public policy choices. However, it is ultimately about the orderliness of the governing process
and its ability to control the entry of emergency immigrants who do
not fit the classical definition. The political branches of an enlightened government are better suited than the courts or administrative
agencies to make these choices.

